Lisa Penunuri and Barry Siegwart, Plaintiffs/ Appellants, vs. Sundance Partners, Ltd; Sundance Holdings, LLC; Sundance Develop11ent Corp; Robertredford;redford 1970 Trust; Rock Mountain Outfitters, l.c.; And Does I-X. Defendants and Appellees. by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2015 
Lisa Penunuri and Barry Siegwart, Plaintiffs/ Appellants, vs. 
Sundance Partners, Ltd; Sundance Holdings, LLC; Sundance 
Develop11ent Corp; Robertredford;redford 1970 Trust; Rock 
Mountain Outfitters, l.c.; And Does I-X. Defendants and Appellees. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Penunuri Sieg v. Sundance Partners, No. 201470854 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3221 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LISA PENUNURI and BARRY 
SIEGWART, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD; 
SUNDANCE HOLDINGS, LLC; 
SUNDANCE DEVELOP11ENT CORP; 
ROBERTREDFORD;REDFORD 
1970 TRUST; ROCK MOUNTAIN 
OUTFITTERS, L.C.; and Does I-X. 
Defendants and Appellees. 
1 ADDENDUMS TO 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 20140854 
Trial Case No: 08040019 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, Presiding 
H. BURT RINGWOOD 
A. JOSEPH SANO 
STRONG & HANNI 
102 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 531-9747 
Attorneys for Appellees 
ROBERT D. STRIEPER (10145) 
STRIEP ER LAW FIRM 
2366 Logan Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Telephone: (801) 631-6421 
Facsimile: (801) 416-3616 
robert@fitrieperlaw.com 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Oral Argument and Published Decision Requested 
U FILED 
TAH A PPELLATE CO UArs 
MAR t 1 2015 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LISA PENUNURI and BARRY 
SIEGWART, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD; 
SUNDANCE HOLDINGS, LLC; 
SUNDANCE DEVELOPMENT CORP; 
ROBERTREDFORD;REDFORD 
1970 TRUST; ROCK MOUNTAIN 
OUTFITTERS, L.C.; and Does I-X. 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 20140854 
Trial Case No: 08040019 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, Presiding 
H. BURT RINGWOOD 
A. JOSEPH SANO 
STRONG & HANNI 
I 02 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 531-9747 
Attorneys for Appellees 
ROBERT D. STRIEPER (10145) 
STRIEPER LAW FIRM 
2366 Logan Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Telephone: (80 I) 631-6421 
Facsimile: (801) 416-3616 
robert@strieperlaw.com 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Oral Argument and Published Decision Requested 
PARTIES 
G) 
1) Lisa Penunuri, Plaintiff and Appellant; 
2) Barry Siegwart, Plaintiff and Appellant; 
3) Sundance Partners, LTD, Defendant and Appellee; @ 
4) Sundance Holdings, LLC, Defendant and Appellee; 
5) Sundance Development Corp., Defendant and Appellee; 
6) Robert Redford, Defendant and Appellee; ~ 
7) Redford 1970 Trust; Defendant and Appellee; 
8) Rocky Mountain Outfitters, L.C.;(Hereinafter "RMO"). 
~ 
9) Does 1-X. 
@ 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ ii 
JURISDICTION ............................................................................................................................. I 
ST A TEMENT OF THE ISSUES & ST AND ARD OF REVIEW .................................................. I 
Issue #1 ........................................................................................................................................... 1 
Did the trial court err when it determined that RMO was entitled to summary judgment in a 
negligence case where the standard of care was not "fixed by law?" . . . . . . . . .. . ..... ............... .. .. . .. I 
Standard of Review ......................................................................................................................... I 
Citation to the Record ..................................................................................................................... 1 
Issue #2 ........................................................................................................................................... 2 
Did the trial court err when it determined that there were no facts to support Penunuri's gross 
negligence claims? .................................................................................................................... 2 
Standard of Review ......................................................................................................................... 2 
Citation to the Record ..................................................................................................................... 2 
Issue #3 ........................................................................................................................................... 2 
Did the trial court err when it determined that one alleged disputable fact; which was first 
presented in the reply memorandum fact section but never argued in either the reply or at oral 
argument; established that Ms. Penunuri could not establish gross negligence, and discarded 
all facts that demonstrated that RMO acted with reckless disregard to Ms. Penunuri's safety 
and granted RMO's Motion for Summary Judgment? ............................................................. 2 
Standard of Review ......................................................................................................................... 3 
Citation to the Record ..................................................................................................................... 3 
Grounds For Seeking Review of An Issue Not (fully) Preserved ................................................... 3 
Issue #4 ........................................................................................................................................... 4 
Did the trial court err when it granted RMO's Summary Judgment on causation based upon a 
mischaracterization of deposition testimony? ........................................................................... 4 
Standard of Review ......................................................................................................................... 4 
Citation to the Record ..................................................................................................................... 4 
Issue #5 ........................................................................................................................................... 4 
Did the trial court error when it granted RMO's Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment 
and excluded Ms. Penunuri's equine expert Scott Earl. ........................................................... 4 
Standard of Review ......................................................................................................................... 4 
Citation to the Record ..................................................................................................................... 5 
Issue #6 ........................................................................................................................................... 5 
Did the trial court err when it granted RMO costs? .................................................................. 5 
Standard of Review ......................................................................................................................... 5 
Citation to the Record ..................................................................................................................... 5 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ........................................................................................................ 5 
ADDENDUMS ............................................................................................................................... 6 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................................... 6 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ....................................................................................... 8 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 17 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 19 
I. Summary Judgment Is Inappropriate When The Standard of Care ls Not Fixed By Law. 20 
II. The Trial Court Erred When It Determined That There Were No Facts To Support 
Penunuri's Gross Negligence Claims ........................................................................................... 22 
III. The Trial Court Erred When It Determined The Outcome of The Entire Case Based Upon 
One Alleged, Disputable Fact . ...................................................................................................... 26 
IV. The Court Erred When It Granted RMO 's Motion For Summary Judgment on Causation 
Based Upon Mischaracterization of Deposition Testimony . ........................................................ 32 
V. The Trial Court Erred When It Granted RMO 's Alternative Motion for Summary 
Judgment And Excluded Penunuri 's Expert Scott Earl . ............................................................... 41 
a) Mr. Earl Is More Than Qualified to Testify As An Expert ................................................. 41 
b) Mr. Earl's Opinions Are Reliable ...................................................................................... 47 
VI. The Trial Court Erred When It Granted RMO 's Costs For Depositions Where RMO Could 
Have Obtained the Same Evidence Through Less Expensive Means . .......................................... 50 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 52 
Requirements ................................................................................................................................ 54 
MAILING CERTIFICATE ........................................................................................................... 54 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(2011) .................................... .1 
CASES 
Albert v. Enterprise Bank of South Carolina 2013 WL 15257 (D.S.C. 2013) .... 23 
Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, 171 P.3d 442 ....... 1, 2, 3, 4, 20, 22 
Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc. 2012 UT 37, 284 P.3d 616 .......... 22 
Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, 2009 UT 66,221 P.3d 256 .... 26, 27, 31 
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, {UT Ct App. 1994) ...................... .4 
ii 
Estate of Belden v. Brown County, 261 P.3d 943, (Kan. 2011) ............... 23 
Eskelson v. Davis Hospital and Medical Center, 2010 UT 59,242 P.3d 762 . .47,48 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P .2d 771, (Utah 1980). . . ........................ 5 
{ii Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, LLC v. Los Angeles Dept of Water and Power, 2012 
UT App 20, 269 P .3d 980 ........................................... .48 
Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 133 P.2d 126, (Utah 1987) ...................... 20 
@ Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, (Utah 1982) ........................... 20 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,130 P.3d 325 ........................ 5, 50, 51 
Madison v. Babcock Ctr. 638 S.E. 2d 650, (S.C. 2006) ..................... 23 
Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 162 F.3d 552, (7th Cir. 2014) ...................... .34 
Milne v. USA Cycling, Inc. 515 F.3d 1120 ................ 20, 21, 41, 42, 44, 45 
Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 2008 UT 13, 179 P.3d 760 ............. 21 
Rodney v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P. 132 S.E. 2d 635, (S.C. 2012) ........... 23 
State Tax Comm 'n v. Stevenson, 2006 UT 84, 150 P.3d 521 .............. 26, 27 
GiJ Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48, 309 P.3d 216 ....................... 19 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah 180 P.2d 821, (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ..... 21, 22 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 ............................. 6, 41, 4 7, 27 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 .................................... 6, 22 
iii 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah and the Appellate Court of Utah have 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 (2014). This 
appeal is from the final order entered on September 9, 2014. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1 
Did the trial court err when it determined that RMO was entitled to summary 
judgment in a negligence case where the standard of care was not "fixed by law?" 
Standard of Review 
Because a grant of summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of 
law, [Appellate Courts] afford no difference to the district court's decision and 
review it for correctness. Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87 at ,rs, 171 
P.3d 442. 
Citation to the Record 
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. at 586-587 and Oral 
Argument at 1575 pp.26-27. 
Issue #2 
Did the trial court err when it determined that there were no facts to support 
Penunuri 's gross negligence claims? 
Standard of Review 
Because a grant of summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of 
law, [Appellate Courts] afford no difference to the district court's decision and 
review it for correctness." See Berry, 2007 UT 87, at ,rs, 
Citation to the Record 
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. at 590-607, 581-586 and 
Oral Argument at 1575 pp. 50-53. Bench Ruling at 1576 p 5-9. 
Issue #3 
Did the trial court err when it determined that one alleged disputable fact; 
which was first presented in the reply memorandum fact section but never argued 
in either the reply or at oral argument; established that Ms. Penunuri could not 
establish gross negligence, and discarded all facts that demonstrated that RMO 
acted with reckless disregard to Ms. Penunuri's safety and granted RMO's Motion 
for Summary Judgment? 
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Standard of Review 
Because a grant of summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of 
law, [Appellate Courts] afford no difference to the district court's decision and 
review it for correctness. Berry 2001 UT 87, ,rs. 
Citation to the Record 
This issue was partially preserved in the trial court at R. 588-607 and R 
1249-1259. Bench Ruling at R.1576, pp. 5-9. 
Grounds For Seeking Review of An Issue Not (fully) Preserved 
RMO in its Reply, while disputing several facts presented by Ms. Penunuri 
in her Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, provided testimony from 
RMO's guide that she was "slowing down the entire time" during the trail ride. 
The statement was not used in the argument section of RMO's reply and was not 
brought up in oral argument, and since it was used to dispute Ms. Penunuri's fact 
in her section, it was obviously a disputed fact. Regardless, the court took the 
testimony as undisputed and determined that a jury could not find the guide grossly 
negligent because the guide was slowing down. Although Ms. Penunuri disputed 
the statement indirectly she never had an opportunity to specifically dispute the 
statement. The record is full of facts that dispute the claim that she was slowing 
down. It was not until the trial court issued its bench ruling that Ms. Penunuri saw 
that the court even considered the disputable statement. 
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Issue #4 
Did the trial court err when it granted RMO's Summary Judgment on 
causation based upon a mischaracterization of deposition testimony? 
Standard of Review 
Because a grant of summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of 
law, [Appellate Courts] afford no difference to the district court's decision and 
review it for correctness. Berry 2001 UT 87, ,r8. 
Citation to the Record 
This issue was preserved in the trial court at 580-581, 588-607, Oral 
Argument at 1575 pp 48-50, Bench Ruling 1576, p. 9. 
Issue #5 
Did the trial court error when it granted RMO's Alternative Motion for 
Summary Judgment and excluded Ms. Penunuri's equine expert Scott Earl. 
Standard of Review 
Because a grant of summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of 
law, [ Appellate Courts] afford no difference to the district court's decision and 
review it for correctness. Berry 2007 UT 87, at ,r8. And, Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 
P.2d 943, 945 (UT Ct App. 1994). 
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Citation to the Record 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1054-1065, and oral argument at 
R. 1575 pp. 3-35. 
Issue #6 
Did the trial court err when it granted RMO costs? 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's "decision to award the prevailing party its costs will be 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 
,I140,130 P.3d 325. "Moreover, in Frampton, we instructed that the trial court has 
a 'duty to guard against excesses or abuses' in awarding costs. Id quoting 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773, (Utah 1980). 
Citation to the Record 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1425-1437, 1438-1447, and 1448-
1455, oral argument at 1577 and R. at 1468-1477. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. (Addendum A) 
2. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702. Testimony by Experts (Addendum A) 
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ADDENDUMS 
ADDENDUM A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 56 and Rule 54, and Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702; Testimony by Experts. 
ADDENDUM B: Order Granting (I) Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
Regarding Gross Negligence and (2) Defendants' Alternative Motion For 
Summary Judgment and Motion To Exclude Scott Earl As An Expert Witness, 
Final Order Of Dismissal and Judgment. 
ADDENDUM C: Order Regarding Determination Of Costs. 
ADDENDUM D: Exhibit of Excerpts of Deposition Testimony Presented During Oral 
Argument on Costs By RMO. (R. at 1468-1477). 
ADDENDUM E: Transcript of Hearing - Oral Argument, January 31, 2014, court's 
Bench Ruling (Rat 1575, pages 25-37). 
ADDENDUM F. Bench Ruling, February 25, 2014, (R. at 1576). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: On August 1, 2007, Lisa Penunuri and her 
two friends arranged with Rocky Mountain Outfitters (RMO) take a guided horse 
trail ride at Sundance Stables. Sundance arranged it so that there were a total of 
five riders and one guide on this trip. Ms. Penunuri had very limited horse 
experience having taken a lesson just prior to the ride, and had not been on any 
previous mountainous rides. 
The beginning order of the riders was: the guide; an eight-year-old 
inexperience child ("child"); the child's mother ("mom"), also inexperienced; Ms. 
Penunuri; and then Ms. Penunuri's two friends ("friends"). The child had problems 
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from the very beginning and at one point the ride had to stop so the guide could 
untangle the child's reins. The order changed when the ride began again with: the 
guide; the friends; the mom; the child; and following in the rear, Ms. Penunuri. 
The child continued to have problems controlling her horse, and the horse took 
advantage of this to graze. As a result, gaps immediately began to form in the train 
of horses. This continued for some time, causing concern with the friends as they 
began to request that the guide slow down or stop and let the group gather together. 
The guide informed the friends that she would continue an addition hundred 
yards up the trail and "pony up" (hold the reins of) the child's horse. The guide 
climbed a short steep section of trail, rounded a bend and passed some hikers 
standing in the brush. When Ms. Penunuri's horse rounded the bend it suddenly 
and unexpectedly to Ms. Penunuri, accelerated to catch up with the herd, and 
causing Ms. Penunuri to fall off the horse. 
At the time of the fall, there were large gaps between the horses. Ms. 
Penunuri has asserted claims against RMO for gross negligence. RMO teaches its 
guides each year about the dangers of gaps in the train of horses; that gaps will 
cause a horse to accelerate to catch up. They also warn of hazards such as hikers, 
up-hills, and blind curves. Ms. Penunuri alleged that RMO's guide in conscious 
disregard of the risk the gaps and hikers posed, continued to proceed up the trail 
without first closing the gaps by stopping and waiting for the horses to come 
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together. When Ms. Penunuri' s horse rounded the bend and came upon the hikers, 
her horse suddenly accelerated and caused her to fall off, fracturing her neck. 
Without the gaps, which the guide had a duty to control, Ms. Penunuri's horse 
would not have accelerated. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: On January 3, 2008 Lisa 
Penunuri and her husband Barry Siegwart ("Penunuri") filed this lawsuit in the 
Fourth District Court against Sundance et al. This is the third appeal in this case. 
The previous two regarded the Equine Act and pre-injury releases, and resulted in 
opinions in favor of RMO. On September 20, 2013 RMO filed two motions for 
summary judgment. The first Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss 
Penunuri' s gross negligence claims, and the second alternative motion was to 
exclude Penunuri's expert Scott Earl. After succeeding on the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, RMO requested costs. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: On September 9, 2014 the trial 
court granted both Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Penunuri's 
remaining claims of gross negligence and awarded the costs. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. According to Scott Earl the standard of care is "common sense" among horse 
people [riders]. (R. at 1066, and 1070). 
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2. Penunuri's expert testified that the gaps caused Penunuri's horse to accelerate, 
which in tum caused her to fall. (R. at 941-942, and 946). 
3. There was a gap of somewhere between 8 to 16 horse lengths between 
Penunuri and the horse she was following. (R. at 1261 ). 
4. RMO's employee manual instructed their guides to prevent large gaps between 
horses, and to warn riders about hazards on the trail. (R. at p. 898, 1252, 1575 
at p. 40,42). 
5. Joseph Loveridge, the owner of RMO, testified that gaps should be no more 
than two to three horse lengths; Rex Walker, RMO's hired expert, testified that 
the gaps should be kept at two to three horse lengths; Brandon Whiteley, a 
guide for RMO, testified that gaps should not extend beyond one to two horse 
lengths. (Rat 590, and R. at 1253[where RMO did not dispute each of these 
witnesses' testimony regarding the proper distances for gaps between horses]). 
6. Penunuri 's expert Scott Earl testified that four horse lengths was acceptable. 
(R. at 1256). 
7. The length of a horse is seven to eight feet long. (R. at 1009, 614, 958, and 
599). 
8. Braydon Whiteley, who is a guide at RMO and intimately familiar with its 
horses, testified that "three horse lengths is probably a bit too far, three to four 
horse lengths." He testified that a gap of three to four horse lengths may cause 
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that horse to run unexpectedly and a gap of ten horse lengths will cause a horse 
to accelerate unexpectedly. (R. at 644, 632 and is undisputed at 1262). 
9. Joseph Loveridge testified that gaps can cause a horse to trot unexpectedly, and 
that when a hiker is on the trail, it is even more important to keep the gaps 
closed. (R. at 590, and 1254). 
10. Where Penunuri fell, she was 102 feet behind Ms. Fort on the trail. Ashley 
Write testified that Penunuri's horse began to accelerate 23 feet before she 
landed on the ground, totaling 125 feet. (R. at 597 and 1261). 
11. RMO agreed with the distance of 125 feet. (R. at 1261). 
12. RMO contended that Ashley Wright was slowing down the whole ride in its 
reply memorandum fact section and that the reason she did not stop was 
because Ms. Penunuri and an eight year old child had stopped. (R. at 1259-
1260). 
13. None of the other riders corroborated the statement, and in fact testified just 
the opposite. The other riders were concerned that Haley and Lisa had gotten 
too far behind and were asking for the guide to slow down so they could catch 
up. Rather than slow down, in response to the request to slow down and close 
the gaps, the guide stated that she would go up the trail another 100 feet to 
pony Haley's horse. (R. at 600-601, Defendants did not reply to this fact, 
where the reply should have been located between 1261-1264 ). 
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14. Suzanne Moag a rider at the front of the group, testified that she was asking 
the guide to stop and wait until everyone caught up. (R. at 848). 
15. The guide Ms. Wright, testified that Haley (the eight year old daughter of Ms. 
Fort) and Penunuri were not stopped but had continued up the trail when the 
guide chose to go another 100 feet to the clearing. (R. at 614 ). 
16. Ms. Wright, the guide, had an opportunity to close the gaps when she came 
upon the hikers after having just climbed a short steep section of trail and 
rounded a bend. (R. at 594). 
1 7. The guide could have stopped and waited for the riders to catch up before she 
passed the hikers. (R. at, 594, 966-967, 907-912). 
I 8. Penunuri's expert testified that the breach in the standard of care was Ms. 
Wright's failure to stop the moment she came upon the hikers to close the large 
gaps that had formed. (R. at 594, 941-942, pp 89-90; 943, p. 85 lines 22-23; 
949, p. 58-59). 
19. Mr. Earl Testified: 
A. There's several factors that could have - or in my opinion, several 
things that could have startled that horse and caused it to start running, 
going around a blind curve, not seeing the other horses at the time, 
being a distance, wanting to catch up. I'm not even saying it was 
startled. 
Q. Just may have wanted to catch up? 
A. Yes, and they will accelerate to catch up. (R. at 396, 594, 949, 1248 
and 1259-1260)(Also argued in open court at 1575, p. 48-49). 
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Q. In fact, Lisa testified that that occurred more than one time on the trail 
ride, that the horse did catch up, that it, giddy upped a little bit. 
A. But people on a curve, and I'm not saying the people did anything 
wrong whatsoever, they might have not moved, but there's a 
possibility that the horse didn't realize that they were there until he 
was right there, and then it startles him. 
Q. But you don't really have an opinion as to why the horse-
A. There is a few things that I have read in the testimonies, that I would 
have an opinion that could have caused the horse to accelerate. 
Q. Okay, And would some of those causes - would all of those causes 
because of the negligence of the guide? 
A. If the space would have been not there, the distance, that - all of 
those causes could have been minimalized, or the factor of the horse 
accelerating. (R. at 948-949, p. 61-62). 
* * * 
A ... Quick acceleration. 
Q. Is there a way to predict that? 
A. There's no way to predict any of it. It's an animal. You can minimize 
the risk by doing certain things. 
Q. But there's always that inherent risk with an animal, you don't know 
what they're going to do? 
A. That's right. (R. at 396, 593, 1258-1259,). 
* * * 
Q. Is it safer to keep the horses moving than to have the horses stop by 
the people? 
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A. If your horses are together, it is safer to continue on and to 
acknowledge, to make sure everybody is aware that there are people 
there. 
Q. But you would agree that the unpredictability of an animal's reaction 
to a person on a trail is an inherent risk associated :with horseback 
riding? 
A. Yes, but you can eliminate or minimize the risk of that. (R. at 955, p. 
36 Lines) 
Q. Would it, in your opinion, be dangerous situation if you had three 
horses within a 34-yard distance? 
A. In my opinion, it wouldn't. I wouldn't call it dangerous, I could call it 
a concern, that you should probably group the horses back up. 
Q. And is one way to do that to stop and try to go back and help those 
horses? 
A. Well, one way is to stop. If you need to go back and pony a horse up 
to get it to cooperate, that's what you better do. 
Q. And that would be within the standard of care, in your opinion, to do 
that? 
A. In my opinion, yes. (R. at 592) 
* * * 
Q. And as she bends around the corner, is it a breach in the standard of 
care not to have waited, at that point, to have gotten all of those horses 
back together? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So at that point, even if they were three or four horse lengths apart, the 
fact of the matter is, she had to get them back to one or two right? 
A. Yes, in my opinion, she should have. 
13 
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Q. . .. It's a breach in her duty not to have gotten those back to one and 
two before she came around the danger, before she saw -
A. After seeing the people and knowing there was danger, yes. 
Q. And so she breached her duty, at that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that point, she's negligent; is that correct? 
A. That would be correct. (R. at 941-942, p.89-90). 
20. Mr. Earl also testified: 
Q. . .. Third, Ashley further breached her duty to keep the riders safe 
when she failed to stop the moment she came around the bend in the 
trail where hikers were waiting in the bushes to let the horses pass. 
There should be no gaps in the horses at any time, but when the horse 
are coming upon a situation that could startle them, extra care should 
be taken to get the horses together before the straggling horses come 
upon the situation. 
Now, your statement there, that there should be no gaps in the 
horses at any time. That's an impossibility; right? 
A. No gaps as in, you know, you're going to have gaps. What is meant 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
there, I guess it isn't written correctly, large gaps. 
And again, how would you define a large gap? 
I would say at this point, you should be one to two horse lengths apart. 
There other points where it's okay to be further apart? 
You should be one to two horse lengths apart at all times, but when 
you're coming up to a danger, to minimize any risks, make sure 
you're there. 
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*** 
Q. And so you're saying is there should have been extra care to be 
taken to get the horses together before the straggling horses comes 
upon the situation? 
A. That is exactly what I'm saying. (R. at 949-950, pp 57-59). 
Mr. Earl also testified: 
Q. ... And then as I reread [your report], I realized what you are saying 
is just slow the train down and let everybody catch up and then [ the 
hikers can] let the horses go by? 
A. See, that can go by people, bridges, water crossings, you 're better off 
to be together at a so-called danger. (R. at 947, p 68 lines 10-16). 
* * * 
Q. Just for clarification, what do you believe caused Lisa [Penunuri] to 
fall off the horse? 
A. I believe the large gaps, which allowed the horse to accelerate 
unexpectedly, that she lost her seating and fell. (R. 946. P 72 lines 14-
18). 
21. Mr. Earl was employed as a guide in the summer of 1982 at Desert Springs 
Country Club, in Grantsville, Utah for four to five months and guided rides 
three to four times a week. (R. at 962, 1068). 
22. In 1983 and 1984, Mr. Earl worked at Jeremy Ranch as a guide. Mr. Earl took 
guests out three times a day seven days a week for five months. (R. at 960-96, 
1067). 
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23. Mr. Earl has owned horses since he was eight years old. (R. at 912). 
24. He owned six horses at the time of his deposition, and the most he has ever 
owned was ten. (R. at 963). 
25. Mr. Earl testified that he worked with his horses "daily." (R. at 941). 
26. Mr. Earl rides his horses on average 150 miles a year and has ridden thousands 
of miles in the Utah mountains with friends and family. Mr. Earl's children 
have owned their own horses before they were eight years old. 
27. The qualifications of Ms. Wright, the guide who led Penunuri's ride, 
according to the owner of RMO, was that she grew up with horses. (R. at 
1070, 1308). 
28. Once hired, Ms. Wright was trained by more experienced riders. (R. at 1070, 
1308). 
29. When Mr. Earl was asked: 
Q. With respect to trail guides, there's really not-is there a publication 
or regulation or something I can go to figure out what the industry 
standard would be? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Do you have any idea how we would determine what industry 
standard would be? 
A. Well, most of it's common sense. And among horse people, it's not 
that hard to figure out what works and what doesn't work, but I don't 
know where you would come up with a standard. 
Q. So you would say it would be based largely on experience, then? 
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A. Right. (R. 591, 1067,959) 
30. Mr. Earl knows how long a horse is because he knows how long his trailer is 
and how many horses he can put in it. (R. at 95 8). 
31. The questions about promulgated industry standards turned out to be trick 
questions, as RMO's expert, Rex Walker, later confirmed in his deposition that 
there were no publications or regulations or any promulgated set standards for 
gaps between horses and that he determines the gaps the same way Mr. Earl 
does, through his experience. (R. at 1066, and 1084 p. 60 lines 1-9). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court made several errors in this case and improperly granted two 
separate motions for summary judgment. The first was determining that Rocky 
Mountain Outfitters ("RMO") was entitled to summary judgment on gross 
negligence when the standard of care was not ''fixed by law." Under Utah's 
unique law, summary judgment is not appropriate on gross negligence claims 
where the standard of care is not fixed by law, unless there is absolutely no 
evidence that could support a claim for negligence. The next error the trial court 
made was to disregard all the facts that Plaintiffs, Lisa Penunuri and Barry 
Seigwart ("Penunuri"), presented, which demonstrated that RMO's guide acted in 
reckless disregard of the safety of the riders; and relied upon one disputable fact, 
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that the guide was slowing down, from RMO's reply memorandum which was not 
presented in either the argument section or in oral argument. Based upon the self-
serving testimony of the guide, the court determined that the guide could not have 
been grossly negligent. The testimony, which was unsupported and disputed by 
the other riders, and also contradicted by the guide herself in other parts of her 
deposition, was improperly accepted by the court as an undisputed fact. 
The next error was when the court accepted the mischaracterizations and 
cherry-picked testimony of Penunuri's expert presented in RMO's motion for 
summary judgment, and from those mischaracterizations determined that 
Penunuri's expert could not opine to causation. Penunuri's expert actually testified 
that without the large gap, none of the other hazards would likely have caused 
Penunuri's horse to accelerate. Next, the trial court erred on RMO's alternative 
Motion for Summary Judgment when it determined that Penunuri's expert was 
unqualified to testify as to the standard of care. The court based its decision on 
Milne v. USA Cycling, lnc. 1 where the expert had only been involved in a dirt bike 
race twice in his youth fourteen years prior. The trial court determined that. 
Penunuri's expert, who led approximately 6,360 guided rides in his youth could 
not testify to the standard of care of an 18 year old guide today. The trial court 
discounted that the expert continues to ride horses most every day to this date in 
1 575 F.3d 1120. 
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the mountains of Utah, and that a horse's behavior is no different on a paid guided 
horse ride as it is on a family ride. Lastly, the court erred in granting RMO's 
motion on costs of depositions when RMO could have obtained the information 
through less expensive means. 
ARGUMENT 
To prove a claim of negligence Penunuri must establish four elements: (I) 
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (RMO's duty was to keep the riders 
safe on a guided trail ride, by not allowing large gaps and by warning · and 
protecting riders from hazards on the trail), (2) that the defendant breached the 
duty (which was breached when RMO's guide permitted large gaps in her train of 
horses and failed to close the gaps when the guide came upon three hazards); (3) 
the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (Because of the gaps, 
Ms. Penunuri's horse unexpectedly accelerated when her horse came upon the 
hazards and the acceleration caused her to fall off the horse), and ( 4) plaintiff @ 
suffered injuries (Ms. Penunuri fractured her neck at C5-C6 with resulting spinal 
cord syndrome). 2 
2 Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48, 19,309 P.3d 216. 
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I. Summarv Judgment ls Inappropriate When The Standard of Care Is Not 
FixedByLaw 
The trial court erred in granting RMO' summary judgment motion, when the 
standard of care was not "fixed by law." As a general rule, summary judgment is 
inappropriate in cases of alleged negligence. 3 "Ordinarily, whether a defendant has 
breached the required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury."4 The 
Supreme Court of Utah has held, "where the standard of care is not 'fixed by law,' 
the determination of the appropriate standard of care is a factual issue to be 
resolved by the trier of fact. "5 The 10th Circuit recognized, "Utah has a special rule 
for summary judgment in negligence cases, including gross negligence cases, and 
is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is fixed by law."6 In Berry 
the Supreme Court explained, "Utah courts will not grant summary judgment in a 
gross negligence case where the applicable standard of care has not been fixed by 
law because '[i]dentification of the proper standard of care is a necessary 
precondition to assessing the degree to which conduct deviates, if at all, from the 
standard of care - the core test in any claim of gross negligence. "'7 For a "standard 
of care . . . to be 'fixed by law' a statute or judicial precedent must articulate 
specific standards" for gaps permitted in between horses during a guided horse 
3 Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P .2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987). 
4 Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613,615 (Utah 1982). 
5 Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87 at i!30, 171 P.3d 442. 
6 Milne v. USA Cycling Inc. 575 F.3d 1120, 1126 (10th Cir, 2009). 
1 Id quoting Berry, 2007 UT 87 at ,r30, 171 P.3d 442,449. 
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ride. 8 There are no statutes and there are no judicial precedents, therefore the 
standard of care is not "fixed by law." The trial court recognized this fact when it 
determined, "we don't have anything that's been established or fixed by law in this 
case." (R. at 1575, P. 27 lines 11-12). 
In this case, Penunuri alleges that RMO was grossly negligent when its 
guide, Ashley Wright, allowed large gaps to form in her train of horses on the 
guided horseback ride and did not stop to close gaps when she came upon hikers in 
the woods. The standard of care regarding how a guide manages gaps in the train 
of horses is not fixed by law. In fact, the standard of care is "common sense" 
among horse riders as each party's experts agreed. (R. at 1066, and 1070). In 
addition, each of the witnesses and experts who were experienced riders agreed 
that horses can accelerate when a gap gets too large, and although they disagree on 
how large the gap needs to become before the horse accelerates, all agreed that the 
maximum gap between the horses should be somewhere between one to four horse 
lengths (See 590, and 1253). Penunuri's expert testified that the gaps caused Ms. 
Penunuri's horse to accelerate, which in turn caused her to fall (R. at 941-942, and 
946). It is undisputed that there were large gaps in Ms. Wright's guided ride of 
somewhere between 8 and 16 horse lengths, at the moment that Ms. Penunuri's 
horse suddenly accelerated and caused her to fall off the horse and fracture her 
8 Id; and Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 2008 UT 13,if 26, 179 P.3d 760, 768. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah 780 P .2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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neck at C5-C6 (R. at 1261). With evidence of negligence, it was inappropriate for 
the trial court to grant the summary judgment motion when the standard of care 
was not fixed by law. 
II. The Trial Court Erred When It Determined That There Were No Facts To 
Support Penunuri's Gross Negligence Claims 
Summary Judgment was not appropriate in this case when the un-disputed 
material facts did not support a judgment as a matter of law. 9 Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 10 "Because a grant of 
summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of law, [Appellate Courts] 
afford no difference to the district court's decision and review it for correctness." 11 
Additionally, "Summary Judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve 
negligence claims and should be employed only in the most clear cut case."12 Of 
particular concern is the precept that ordinarily, whether or not a defendant 
breached the standard of care is question of fact for the jury. 13 Furthermore, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "since summary disposition denies the losing 
party the privilege of a trial, art I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution suggests that doubt 
9 Utah Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 56 
10 Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc. 2012 UT 37, at ,I6, 284 P.3d 616. 
11 Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87 at ,rs, 171 P.3d 442. 
12 Blaisdell 2012 UT 37 at ,I16, quoting Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 
87 at ,I27, 171 P.3d 442. 
13 Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P .2d 821, 825, (UT App. 1989). 
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or uncertainty as to the question of negligence should resolve in favor of granting a 
trial." 14 Additionally, the "standard of care in a given case !!1fil!. be established and 
defined by the common law, statutes, administrative regulations, industry 
standards, or a defendant's own policies and guide/ines." 15 
In this case, Penunuri presented evidence that RMO had a safety policy to 
keep large gaps from forming in the train of horses to protect the riders from being 
thrown off the horses. Penunuri presented evidence that RMO's owner, RMO's 
expert, RMO's own guide, and Penunuri's experts all agreed that keeping the gaps 
to a maximum of four horse lengths or less was the standard of care. (R. at 590 
and 1253 ). The trial court did not accept the evidence as the standard of care; in 
fact the trial court rejected the evidence outright and granted RMO's motion for 
summary judgment. Specifically, the trial court incorrectly concluded, 
14 ]d. 
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence upon which reasonable minds 
could conclude that Defendants' guide, Ashley Wright, exercised no 
care. Nor have Plaintiffs presented any evidence to show that Ashley 
Wright knew or had reason to know of facts that would have created a 
high degree of risk of physical harm to Plaintiff Penunuri, but 
deliberately proceeded to act, or fail to act, in conscious disregard of, 
or indifference to, that risk." (R. at 1547) 
15 Estate of Belden v. Brown County, 261 P .3d 943, 964 (Kan. 2011 ), Rodney v. 
Wal-Mart Stores East L.P. 732 S.E. 2d 635, 648 (S.C. 2012) and Albert v. 
Enterprise Bank of South Carolina 2013 WL 15257 (D.S.C. 2013)(Finding a 
"plaintiff may prove her claims by demonstrating that the defendant failed to 
comply with their own policies and procedure.") citing Madison v. Babcock Ctr. 
638 S.E. 2d 650, 659 (S.C. 2006). 
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In its order, the trial court created an "Undisputed Facts as Found by the 
Court." (R at 1555). The court accepted the cherry-picked facts from RMO's 
motion and completely disregarded Penunuri's undisputed facts. In particular, the 
court chose to ignore RMO's employee manual, which instructs its guides to: 
[t]ake your responsibility seriously. Guests trust you with their safety 
and often with the safety of their children. They look to you for 
experience, instruction, leadership, and knowledge. They also look to 
you for fun and entertainment. They look to you to make their 
experience exactly what they want it to be -fun, memorable, exciting, 
and safe. (R. at 1252, and 1575 p. 39). 
In regards to keeping the ride safe, RMO's employee manual provided three 
simple safety instructions for the guides: keep gaps from forming; warn of 
obstacles such as hills and hikers; and keep the saddle from slipping: 
Once on the trail, it is the guide 's responsibility to continually watch 
over and monitor the safety and comfort of his/her guests. 
1. Keep your ride in control. Keep guests in site at all times possible. 
While there are times that they will be unseen constant interaction 
with guests will help keep a controlled environment. 
2. Adiust your pace so that large gaps do not form between horses 
in vour string. Gaps encourage horses to trot un-expectedlv. 
3. Advise your guests of upcoming obstacles that may be difficult or 
intimidating. Teach them what to do and assure them they will be 
o.k. ( Up-hills. down hills, tree branch, logs, hikers. etc.) 
4. Continually remind guests of safety issues. re-teaching as you go. 
5. Re-assess the tightness of saddles and remind guests to inform you 
if they feel their saddle slipping from one side to the other. 
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6. Constantly have safety on your mind! (Emphasis added) 
(Record on Appeal at p. 898, 1252, 1575 at p. 40,42). 
In recognition of these dangers: Joseph Loveridge, the owner of RMO, 
testified that gaps should be no more than two to three horse lengths; Rex Walker, 
RMO's hired expert, testified that the gap should be kept at two to three horse 
lengths; Brandon Whiteley, a guide for RMO, testified that gaps should not extend 
beyond one to two horse lengths. (Rat 590, and 1253). Penunuri's expert, Scott 
Earl's testimony, gives RMO the largest leeway, that on this ride and on this trail, 
the horses could have a gap of up to four horse lengths. (R. at 1256). 
The length of a horse is seven to eight feet. (R. at 1009, 614,958, and 599). 
Braydon Whiteley, who is a guide at RMO and familiar with its horses, testified 
that "three horse lengths is probably a bit too far, three to four horse lengths." He 
further testified that a gap of three to four horse lengths may cause that horse to run 
unexpectedly and a gap of ten horse lengths will cause a horse to accelerate 
unexpectedly. (R. at 644, 632 and 1262). Joseph Loveridge testified that gaps can 
cause a horse to trot unexpectedly, and that when a hiker is on the trail, it is even 
more important to keep the gaps closed. (R. at 590, and 1254). Where Ms. 
Penunuri fell, she was 102 feet behind Ms. Fort on the trail. (R. at 597 and 1261). 
Ashley Write testified that Ms. Penunuri 's horse began to accelerate 23 feet before 
she landed on the ground. (R. at 597 and 1261). Therefore, Ms. Penunuri's horse 
had a gap of 125 feet. (R. at 1261 ). 
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In response to the actual distance where Ms. Penunuri's horse accelerated 
and where Ms. Penunuri fell, RMO replied, "Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs' 
response to Defendants Fact No. 18. The exact distance between Ms. Fort's horse 
and [Ms. Penunuri's] horse when she fell, whether it was 102 feet or 125 feet, is 
immaterial for purposes of this motion" (R. at 1261). RMO contended that these 
facts, although true and undisputed, were immaterial. (R. at 1261, 1253-1254). 
RMO was wrong, as these facts are the facts as to the standard of care and 
causation and as such should have precluded the court from granting RMO's 
summary judgment motion. These undisputed facts, should also have created a 
rebuttable presumption of negligence; they certainly should not have been 
disregarded in their entirety. 
III. The Trial Court Erred When It Determined The Outcome of The Entire 
Case Based Upon One Alleged, Disputable Fact. 
As discussed supra, the determination of the deviation from the standard of 
care in gross negligence is a question for the jury. Milne, 575 F.3d at 1126. In 
"Utah gross negligence is equated with reckless disregard." 16 "Recklessness 
includes conduct where the actor kn[ew] , or ha[d] reason to know, ... of facts 
which created a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and deliberately 
16 Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, 2009 UT 66, ,r 43,221 P.3d 256 quoting 
State Tax Comm 'n v. Stevenson, 2006 UT 84 ,r 25, 150 P .3d 521. 
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proceeds to act, or fails to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that 
risk." 17 
A jury certainly could determine that RMO's guide knew that large gaps 
between horses in her trail ride was a particular danger. A jury could also find that 
she knew that hikers, steep sections of trail, and sharp bends, also posed a risk to 
the riders. The dangers are spelled out in the employee manual she received each 
year she was a guide at RMO. A jury could determine that she acted in conscious 
disregard of the hazards when she chose to continue riding up the trail for another 
hundred yards while the gaps remained in the ride knowing those riders would 
each have to pass the hazards of the hikers, sharp tum, and steep incline, instead of 
stopping at that moment to close the gaps. A jury could find that she deliberately 
and consciously proceeded to ride on up the trail indifferent to the risks that the 
gaps alone and in combination with the hikers and other obstacles presented to the 
riders. A jury could find that she was grossly negligent. 
The court disregarded these facts and the facts regarding the standard of care 
which required that she stop, and accepted one alleged and disputable fact. The 
disputable and unsupportable fact was RMO's guide's testimony that she was 
slowing down the entire ride. The disputable fact was presented for the first time 
in RMO's reply memorandum in response to a fact alleged by Penunuri and was 
11 Jd. 
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not even used in the argument section of the reply. Based upon this alleged fact, 
the trial court took the determination of gross negligence and the degree of the 
deviation away from the jury and weighed this disputable fact against all of Ms. 
Penunuri's undisputed facts, and determined that RMO's guide could not have 
been grossly negligent. 
Since it was not presented in the opening memorandum, not presented in the 
reply's argument, and not presented in the oral argument, Penunuri was not even 
given a chance to dispute the fact. The fact was never used in any argument, but 
was presented only in RMO's reply to Penunuri's response to RMO's Fact No. 29 
and in Reply to Penunuri's Facts No. 5 and 14 (R. at 1259) . Fact No. 29 and 
Penunuri's responses and RMO's reply are as follows: 
{Defendants' Fact No. 29[ During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that he 
does not know what caused Plaintiffs horse to accelerate, but gave several 
possible reasons. He stated: 
A. There's several factors that could have - or, in my opinion, several 
things that could have startled that horse and caused it to start running, 
going around a blind curve, not seeing the other horses at the time, 
being a distance, wanting to catch up. I'm not even saying it was 
startled. 
Q. Just may have wanted to catch up? 
A. Yes, and they will accelerate to catch up. 
* * * 
Disputed. This completely mischaracterizes Mr. Earl's opinions. It is 
not relevant what caused Ms. Penunuri's horse to accelerate when it 
came around the bend. In fact there were probably multiple causes to 
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what lead to the acceleration. What is relevant is that the guide could 
have prevented Ms. Penunuri's horse from accelerating by following 
RMO's employee manual. What is relevant is that there were gaps 
between the horses, Ashley was aware of the gaps, Ashley came upon 
hikers around a sharp bend hiding in the trail, Ashley was aware that 
hikers posed a risk to the riders, Ashley could have prevented the 
horse from accelerating. All Ashley needed to do was follow Rocky 
Mountain Outfitters' employee handbook by stopping and closing the 
gaps and if Ashley would have stopped it would have more likely than 
not prevented Ms. Penunuri's horse from accelerating unexpectedly 
around the bend. (Scott Earl's deposition at p. 57, 62 report and 
Declaration attached hereto as Ex. J). 
* * * 
Defendant's Reply. . . With respect to Plaintiff's assertion that Ashley 
had a duty to close the gaps, Ashley testified that she had been 
"slowing down the whole ride. " However, slowing down the ride did 
not allow Haley and Lisa to catch up because Haley's horse had 
stopped to graze. something that could only be remedied by Ashley 
attempting to take the reins from Haley and pony the horse the rest of 
the way . .. (R. at 1259-1260) 
If this alleged fact was brought up in RMO's opening memorandum it would 
certainly have been easily and specifically disputed. All the same, the facts 
presented by Penunuri indirectly disputed the allegation. First, as pointed out in 
Penunuri's response to RMO's Fact No. 16, none of the other riders testified that 
Ashley slowed down; rather, 
the other riders were concerned that Haley and Lisa had gotten too far 
behind and were asking for Ashley to slow down so that they could 
catch up. Rather than slow down, in response to the request to slow 
down and close the gaps Ashley stated she would go up to the trail 
another 100 feet to pony Haley's horse. (R. at 600-601, Defendants 
did not reply to this fact, where the reply should have been located 
between 1261-1264 ). 
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In addition, Suzanne Moag a rider at the front of the group, testified: 
But as we road on, the gap between the horses became more and 
more. And at one point I said to Ashley [the guide] that Haley and 
Lisa [Ms. Penunuri] had fallen too far behind and I couldn't see them 
and that we needed - ... I told Ashley that we had to wait up, to stop. 
And she said that we would stop at the clearing farther on and that she 
would pony Haley in. (R. at 848). 
In addition, the guide, Ms. Wright, testified that Haley (the eight year old daughter 
of Ms. Fort) and Ms. Penunuri were not stopped but had continued up the trail 
when the guide choose to go another 100 feet to the clearing: Ms. Wright 
specifically testified: 
Obviously [Haley's] horse was moving because it got into the open 
space as I was turning around to grab it. So her horse moved, yes. (R. 
at 614). 
And, in regards to Ms. Penunuri's horse, Ms. Wright testified: 
And from me going the 100 feet of where I said that, Lisa [Ms. 
Penunuri] was not just sitting there. So I didn't go 100 feet away 
from Lisa as she was stopped, no. (R. at 614 ). 
The trial court decided to weigh the alleged and disputable fact against all of 
the undisputed facts to determine that RMO could not have been grossly negligent, 
relying upon this fact placed only in the Reply memorandum, the trial court 
determined that Penunuri could not prove, "defendants failed to observe even the 
slightest care." This opinion arose for the first time on February 25, 2014 during a 
phone conference. Oral argument was not permitted during the phone conference. 
The trial court's full opinion is: 
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The testimony which I think is undisputed is that Ashley Wright, who 
was acting as the trial guide in this incident, was attempting to slow 
down the group. That was her testimony: that she was attempting to 
slow down the group so that the last two horses could catch up. She 
was attempting to get the group to a larger clearing, an open area 
where she could get the group back together, and then she was 
actually going to pony - which from what I read means to go back, 
she was going to go back to Haley's horse and guide Haley's horse for 
her by taking the reins and pulling the horse along with her so that the 
horse would quit grazing. I don't find anything in the undisputed 
facts which persuades me that Ashley, and thereby the other 
defendants, failed to observe even slight care. I don't find that under 
the definition of recklessness from Daniels v. Gamma West 
Brachytherapy, is the full title, that she knew or had reason to know of 
facts which created a high degree of risk of physical harm, and that 
she deliberately proceeded to act or failed to act in conscious 
disregard of or indifference to that risk. (R. at 1576, [February 25, 
2014 Bench Ruling], at p 7:lines 4-23). 
The trial court went on: 
As I look at what we're dealing with here, we've got ordinary 
negligence, which is a kind of the baseline, and then we've got gross 
negligence, which is far, far above and beyond ordinary negligence. 
And I don't think that under those facts which are truly undisputed 
here, we have anything that shows Ashley acted in a way that showed 
utter disregard and a lack of care for the situation. She said that she 
was trying to slow down the group. and she was aware of the issue 
and was attempting to solve the problem. I think for the plaintiff to 
succeed here and to prove that she showed a failure to observe even 
slight care, she would have just had to have marched on at normal 
speed, perhaps taking the more experienced riders with her leaving 
the three less experienced riders, including Haley's mother, in the 
dust, so to speak, and that didn't happen. (Id at pp. 7-8: lines 24-25). 
Besides the obvious fact that the court made a decision on the facts and not 
the law, and thereby made a decision which is exclusively the province of the jury, 
the alleged fact that Ms. Wright was slowing down cannot be substantiated by the 
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record and is fully contradicted by the facts that the trial court disregarded. 
Therefore, contrary to what the court decided, there is evidence that the guide, Ms. 
Wright, did just march on at a normal speed and did not stop as the other riders 
were begging her to do. (R. at 600-601, and 848). Ms. Wright, the guide, had an 
opportunity to close the gaps when she came upon the hikers after having just 
climbed a short steep section of trail and rounded a bend. (R. at 594 ). The guide 
could have stopped and waited for the riders to catch up before she passed the 
hikers. (R. at, 594, 966-967, 907-912). According to Ms. Penunuri's expert, the 
breach in the standard of care was Ms. Wright's failure to stop the moment she 
came upon the hikers to close the gaps that had formed. (R. at 594, 941-942, pp 
89-90; 943, p. 85 lines 22-23; 949, p. 58-59). Therefore, a jury could find that the 
guide left the three inexperienced riders in the dust. 
IV. The Court Erred When It Granted RMO's Motion For Summary 
Judgment on Causation Based Upon Mischaracterization o{Deposition 
Testimony. 
Summary judgment is not appropriate in instances where a party cherry-
picks facts out of a deposition that are helpful to its position while ignoring the 
facts in the deposition that will prevent the summary judgment from being granted. 
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, recently addressed 
cherry-picking in the context of employment discrimination. The Court had the 
following to say: 
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We close by noting our disappointment with [defendant's] approach 
to summary judgment practice, which is such a common part of 
modern federal civil litigation . . . Both in the district court and in this 
appeal, [defendant] has misrepresented the record and [plaintiffs] 
legal arguments. For example, [defendant] repeatedly cherry-picked 
isolated phrases from [plaintiffs] deposition and claimed these 
"admissions" doomed her case. When the testimony is read in 
context, however, it becomes clear that [plaintiff] made no such 
admissions, and that [defendant's] presentation of the evidence 
amounted to nothing more than selectively quoting deposition 
language it likes and ignoring deposition it does not like. 
For example, on the subject of [plaintiffs] qualifications for the 
empty Relationship Quality Management position, [defendant] 
claimed that [plaintiff] conceded that Anil Monga, who was 
eventually hired to fill the position, was better qualified than she was. 
That is simply incorrect: [Plaintiff] actually testified that in some 
ways Monga was more qualified than she and that in some ways she 
was more qualified than Monga. Similarly, [defendant] claimed that 
[plaintiff] admitted she had no information to support her claim that 
[defendant] retaliated against her for requesting FMLA leave. Her 
deposition testimony is clear, however, that she was talking about the 
basis for her subjective belief that she was being retaliated against, not 
whether she had introduced evidence of retaliation in her lawsuit. 
These misrepresentations of the record did not comport with the 
parties' duty of candor to the courts. 
[Defendant] seems to have based its litigation strategy on the hope 
that neither the district court nor this panel would take the time to 
check the record. Litigants who take this approach often ( and we hope 
almost always) find that they have misjudged the court. We caution 
[defendants] and other parties tempted to adopt this approach to 
summary judgment practice that it quickly destroys their credibility 
with the court. 
This approach to summary judgment is also both costly and wasteful. 
If a district court grants summary judgment in a party's favor based 
upon its mischaracterizations of the record, the judgment will in all 
likelihood be appealed, overturned, and returned to the district court 
for settlement or trial. This course is much more expensive than 
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simply pursing a settlement or trying the case in the first instance. 
Further, the costs incurred while engaging in these shenanigans stand 
a real chance of being declared excessive under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
even if the abusive party prevails at trial on remand. Risking such 
pitfalls in the hope of avoiding a trial is a dramatic miscalculation of 
the risks and rewards of each approach. 18 
In this instance, RMO ignored the facts regarding the standard of care, in 
which all parties agreed that the standard of care required the guide to keep large 
gaps from forming and that gaps should be less than four horse lengths, likewise, 
RMO misrepresented Penunuri's facts supporting her legal argument on causation. 
Penunuri's legal argument is that there were large gaps in the train of horses; 
that the guide was responsible for the gaps, and was required to close those gaps; 
that when the guide rounded a sharp bend in the trail, just after she had climbed a 
steep hill, and came upon hikers sitting in the woods she should have closed the 
gaps at that very moment before the remaining horses rounded the bend and came 
upon the same dangers. She should have stopped at that moment. Instead, the 
guide choose to ride an additional I 00 feet up the trail before stopping. 
When the guide chose to go on at that moment without closing the large 
gaps between the horses, she was sitting on a keg of dynamite. The match which 
sets the keg ablaze has little relevance to causation, because without the keg of 
dynamite, whether the match was; the sharp turn, the hikers in the shrubs, the steep 
climb, or the fact that the distances between the horses were somewhere between 
18 Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 564-65(7th Cir. 2014). 
34 
60 and 125 feet; without the gaps, the match simply goes out and Ms. Penunuri is 
not injured. Without the large gaps, a horse has no need or ability to suddenly 
accelerate and catch up. The order that was written by RMO and signed by the 
court, states "Plaintiffs seems to take the position that, regardless of what caused 
the horse to accelerate, RMO's guide should have prevented the horse from acting 
unpredictably" (R. at 1545). Penunuri did not take this position, Penunuri's 
position was that the guide could have and should have controlled the gaps, 
especially, when she came upon three dangerous situations at one point on the trail. 
RMO cherry-picked the facts to argue that the gap, the blind curve, the hikers, and 
the steep incline were each separate possible causes of Ms. Penunuri's injuries, 
whereas the actual testimony was that if not for the gaps, the other factors would 
not have caused the acceleration. 
Specifically, RMO cherry-picked and relied upon Scott Earl's incomplete 
testimony wherein he testified: 
A. There's several factors that could have - or in my opinion, several 
things that could have startled that horse and caused it to start running, 
going around a blind curve, not seeing the other horses at the time, 
being a distance, wanting to catch up. I'm not even saying it was 
startled. 
Q. Just may have wanted to catch up? 
A. Yes, and they will accelerate to catch up. (R. at 396, 594, 949, 1248 
and 1259-1260)(Also argued in open court at 1575, p. 48-49). 
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This is where RMO ended its quote, but as Penunuri pointed out, this 
incomplete questioning mischaracterized Mr. Earl's testimony. (R. at 594 ). The 
questioning continued as follows: 
Q. In fact, Lisa testified that that occurred more than one time on the trail 
ride, that the horse did catch up, that it, giddy upped a little bit. 
A. But people on a curve, and I'm not saying the people did anything 
wrong whatsoever, they might have not moved, but there's a 
possibility that the horse didn't realize that they were there until he 
was right there, and then it startles him. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
But you don't really have an opinion as to why the horse-
There is a few things that I have read in the testimonies, that I would 
have an opinion that could have caused the horse to accelerate. 
Okay, And would some of those causes - would all of those causes 
because of the negligence of the guide? 
A. If the space would have been not there, the distance, that - all of 
those causes could have been minimalized, or the factor of the horse 
accelerating. (R. at 948-949, p. 61-62). 
Mr. Earl's testimony goes on to state that the guide was negligent for not 
warning the guests of the danger around the bend, the hikers. (Id). RMO's next 
selective quote is: 
A ... Quick acceleration. 
Q. Is there a way to predict that? 
A. There's no way to predict any of it. It's an animal. You can minimize 
the risk by doing certain things. 
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Q. But there's always that inherent risk with an animal, you don't know 
what they're going to do? · 
A. That's right. (R. at 396, 593, 1258-1259,). 
This selective quotes was used by RMO to state "[t]hus according to Ms. 
Penunuri's own expert, Mr. Earl, a horse's sudden acceleration is an inherent risk 
of horseback riding that no one can predict" implying that it cannot be prevented. 
RMO emphasized the phrase "[t]here's no way to predict any of it. It's an animal," 
without emphasizing "[y ]ou can minimize the risk by doing certain things." 
RMO's facts failed to include the fact that Mr. Earl also testified that the danger of 
quick accelerations could be eliminated or minimized. In particular he testified: 
Q. Is it safer to keep the horses moving than to have the horses stop by 
the people? 
A. If your horses are together, it is safer to continue on and to 
acknowledge, to make sure everybody is aware that there are people 
there. 
Q. But you would agree that the unpredictability of an animal's reaction 
to a person on a trail is an inherent risk associated with horseback 
riding? 
A. Yes, but you can eliminate or minimize the risk of that. (R. at 955, p. 
36 Lines) 
In a footnote, RMO used the following testimony of Mr. Earl to imply that at the 
location where Ms. Penunuri fell it was proper for the three horses to be spread 
over 34 yards. 
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Q. Would it, in your opinion, be dangerous situation if you had three 
horses within a 34-yard distance? 
A. In my opinion, it wouldn't. I wouldn't call it dangerous, I could call it 
a concern, that you should probably group the horses back up. 
Q. And is one way to do that to stop and try to go back and help those 
horses? 
A. Well, one way is to stop. If you need to go back and pony a horse up 
to get it to cooperate, that's what you better do. 
Q. And that would be within the standard of care, in your opinion, to do 
that? 
A. In my opinion, yes. 
What RMO left off, is that when Mr. Earl was asked about the specific 
situation with the dangers of the sharp curve, the hikers in the woods, and not 
seeing the other horses; he testified: 
Q. . .. Third, Ashley further breached her duty to keep the riders safe 
when she failed to stop the moment she came around the bend in the 
trail where hikers were waiting in the bushes to let the horses pass. 
There should be no gaps in the horses at any time, but when the horse 
are coming upon a situation that could startle them, extra care should 
be taken to get the horses together before the straggling horses come 
upon the situation. 
Now, your statement there, that there should be no gaps in the 
horses at any time. That's an impossibility; right? 
B. No gaps as in, you know, you're going to have gaps. What is meant 
there, I guess it isn't written correctly, large gaps. 
Q. And again, how would you define a large gap? 
A. I would say at this point, you should be one to two horse lengths apart. 
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Q I there other points where it's okay to be further apart? 
A. You should be one to two horse lengths apart at all times, but when 
you're coming up to a danger, to minimize any risks, make sure 
you're there. 
*** ~ 
Q. And so you're saying is there should have been extra care to be 
taken to get the horses together before the straggling horses comes 
upon the situation? 
A. That is exactly what I'm saying. (R. at 949-950, pp 57-59). 
Mr. Earl also testified: 
Q. . .. And then as I reread [your report], I realized what you are saying 
is just slow the train down and let everybody catch up and then [the 
hikers can] let the horses go by? 
B. See, that can go by people, bridges, water crossings, you 're better off 
to be together at a so-called danger. (R. at 947, p 68 lines 10-16). 
RMO asked, yet in its motion did not include, the following testimony by Mr. Earl: 
Q. Just for clarification, what do you believe caused Lisa [Penunuri] to 
fall off the horse? 
A. I believe the large gaps, which allowed the horse to accelerate 
unexpectedly, that she lost her seating and fell. (R. 946. P 72 lines 14-
18). 
RMO also failed to include what the guide Ms. Wright could have done, to prevent 
the gaps, wherein Mr. Earl testified: 
Q. And as she bends around the corner, is it a breach in the standard of 
care not to have waited, at that point, to have gotten all of those horses 
back together? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. So at that point, even if they were three or four horse lengths apart, the 
fact of the matter is, she had to get them back to one or two right? 
A. Yes, in my opinion, she should have. 
Q. . .. It's a breach in her duty not to have gotten those back to one and 
two before she came around the danger, before she saw -
A. After seeing the people and knowing there was danger, yes. 
Q. And so she breached her duty, at that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that point, she's negligent; is that correct? 
A. That would be correct. (R. at 941-942, p.89-90). 
RMO knew the testimony of Mr. Earl, and knew it would have precluded 
them from asserting the motion for summary judgment, and instead of foregoing 
the motion, it chose to cherry-pick the testimony and go forward with the motion. 
Based upon the cherry-picked testimony of Mr. Earl, the trial court wrongly 
concluded that "Because Plaintiff has not, without engaging in impermissible 
speculation, presented any evidence establishing that Defendants' conduct was the 
proximate cause of the horse's unexpected acceleration, as opposed to the various 
'inherent risks' associated with horseback riding, Plaintiffs' claims fails as a matter 
of law." Without cherry-picking the record, Mr. Earl established that the cause of 
Ms. Penunuri' s injury was not speculation but was attributed to the large gaps and 
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the guide's failure to stop to close the gaps when she came upon the dangers on the 
trail. 
V. The Trial Court Erred When It Granted RMO's Alternative Motion for 
Summarv Judgment And Excluded Penunuri's Expert Scott Earl. 
a) Mr. Earl ls More Than Qualified to Testify As An Expert 
Rule 702 (a) provides: 
Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b ), a witness is qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, Q!. education may 
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. 19 
The trial court ruled, "Because the standard of care applicable to commercial 
trail guiding and the issue of what caused Plaintiff's horse to accelerate are both 
outside the knowledge and experience of the average layperson, the Court finds 
that Plaintiffs must present expert opinion." (R. 1540). The trial court's decision 
to exclude Mr. Earl was based only upon what the trial court determined were his 
qualifications under Rule 702(a). The court did not address whether or not the 
testimony was reliable or unreliable, (R. at 1575, p.32 lines 23-24) and the court's 
opinion was based upon the holding in Milne & Hall v. USA Cycling, Inc. 20 (R. at 
1575, p. 33, Lines 2-3). 
19 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702(a). 
20 Milne, 575 F.3d 1120. 
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In Milne the hired expert was precluded from giving testimony that "race 
organizers were grossly negligent" regarding the sufficiency of defendant's 
precautions to avoid accidents. 21 In Milne two mountain bike riders were struck by 
an SUV on a dirt road, killing one of the bikers and seriously injuring another. 22 In 
Milne: 
[Plaintiffs expert] admittedly had no experience in orgamzmg, 
supervising, or studying mountain bike races and, therefore, was not 
qualified to offer expert testimony on the standard of care for 
mountain bike races. At his deposition, [the expert] was asked, 'As a 
matter of fact - just so we're clear, you're not an expert on mountain 
bike racing ... is that a fair statement?' He answered, 'Yes it is.' Nor 
was he even an experience mountain bike rider. He had only 
participated in one or two mountain bike races, and those were more 
than 15 years ago. He had never published any articles about bicycle 
racing of any sort, let alone mountain bike racing. He testified that, as 
a police officer, he investigated hundreds of vehicle-bicycle collisions, 
but there was no indication that any of those took place on a dirt road 
or in the course of a race. 
Although [the expert] had experience organ1zmg and supervising 
paved road bike races, the district court reasonably concluded that his 
experience was insufficient to qualify him to testify about mountain 
bike races. The facts of this case make it clear that the rules and 
practices that prevail at mountain bike races - even the on-the-road 
portion of mountain bike races - are different from the rules and 
practices that prevail at traditional road races. 23 
This case is unlike Milne, where the expert had only been on two mountain bike 
races, fifteen years prior; Mr. Earl has led thousands of guided horse rides. Mr. 
21 Id at 1133. 
22 /dat 1123 
23 Id at 1133-1134. 
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Earl was employed as a guide in the summer of 1982 at Desert Springs Country 
Club, in Grantsville, Utah (R. at 962, 1068). Mr. Earl worked there for four to five 
months. (Id) He took riders out three to four times a week (Id). Mr. Earl therefore, 
took guests out at Desert Springs for approximately 60 guided rides (R. at 962, pp 
6-7). In 1983 and 1984, Mr. Earl worked at Jeremy Ranch as a guide (R. at 960-
96, 1067). Mr. Earl took guests out three times a day for five months seven days a 
week (Id). Therefore, between 1983 and 1984 Mr. Earl guided approximately 
6,300 trail. (Id). In total, Mr. Earl was paid to guide horse trail rides in his lifetime 
for approximately 6,360 horse rides, unlike the two bike races in which the expert 
participated in Milne. Although it has been twenty-three years since he was 
employed as a guide, horses and their behavior cannot be argued to have changed 
in that time. 
Additionally, Mr. Earl has owned horses since he was eight years old. (R. at 
912). At the time of his deposition he testified that he always owned horses and 
that he presently owned six horses, and the most he has ever owned was ten. (R. at 
963). Mr. Earl testified that he worked with his horses "daily." (R. at 941). Mr. 
Earl testified as the deposition concluded, if we "get done in time, I'm going for a 
ride." (R. at 941 ). Mr. Earl's experience with horses in 1982-84 gave him all the 
experience he needed as a paid guide, and his vast experience with horses allowed 
him to become a mounted patrol officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs office 
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and the liaison officer for the Sheriffs mounted posse. (R. at 1182). Mr. Earl 
rides his horses on average 150 miles a year and has ridden thousands of miles in 
the Utah mountains in his lifetime riding with friends and family. (Id). In fact, 
Mr. Earl's children have owned their own horses before they were eight years old. 
(R. at 950, p.54;1ines I 0-11 ). As for the qualifications of Ms. Wright, the 18-year-
old guide who led Ms. Penunuri 's ride, according to the owner of RMO her 
qualification to become a guide was that she grew up with horses. (R. at 1070, 
1308). 
In this case, unlike in Milne where the issue was the complicated process of 
running, designing, managing and organizing a mountain bike race; the issue here 
is not complicated, it is not about the process of running a horse operation, or 
designing a horse riding trail. The issue here is keeping riders safe while taking 
them on a guided horse ride, and knowing the simple safety rules to keep any rider 
safe. Since the rules are based entirely upon horses' typical responses to situations, 
the rules are the same regardless of if the ride is with family and friends, or a paid 
guided ride. RMO employs high school students as their guides. The rules for a 
guide during the ride are very simple and spelled out in the employee manual given 
to RMO guides. 
1. Keep the ride in control. Keep guests in sight at all times possible. While 
there are times that they will be unseen constant interaction with guests 
will help keep a controlled environment. 
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2. Adjust your pace so that large gaps do not form between horses in your 
string. Gaps encourage horses to trot unexpectedly. 
3. Advise your guests of upcoming obstacles that may be difficult or 
intimidating. Teach them what to do and assure them they will be o.k. 
(Up-hills, down hills. Tree branch, log, hikers, etc). 
4. Continually remind guests of safety issues, re-teaching as you go. 
5. Re-assess the tightness of saddles and remind guest to inform you if they 
feel their saddle slinging from one side to another. 
6. Constantly have safety on your mind. (R. at 898). 
The same rules apply to any group of horses on a trail. In Milne, the rules 
for road biking and mountain biking were significantly different and promulgated 
by racing organizations. In this case, a horse is not going to know if it is in a paid 
guided trip or on a personal trip with a family. The horse is going to behave the 
same. A large gap in either a family trip or in a paid guided trip will have the same 
consequences and Mr. Earl's experience, as he testified to on multiple occasions, 
qualifies him to testify as to the very simple and narrow issues of this case. (R. at 
962, 961 at p. 12 lines 13-25, 951, 958, etc). 
In this case and unlike in Milne, where the expert testified that he was not an 
expert on mountain bike racing, Mr. Earl was able to describe how to keep any 
rider on a trail safe through his experience. 
When Mr. Earl was asked 
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Q. With respect to trail guides, there's really not-is there a publication 
or regulation or something I can go to figure out what the industry 
standard would be? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Do you have any idea how we would determine what industry 
standard would be? 
A. Well, most of its common sense. And among horse people, it's not 
that hard to figure out what works and what doesn't work, but I don't 
know where you would come up with a standard. 
Q. So you would say it would be based largely on experience, then? 
A. Right. 
Throughout his testimony, when Mr. Earl was asked how he knew 
something, he repeatedly testified that it was through his experience. Such as 
when asked how he knew the length of a horse he testified about his experience of 
loading horses on trailers and how long his trailer was and how many horses he 
could place in it. (R. at 95 8). When asked, "do you know of any industry standard 
with respect to gaps that become a problem?" Again Mr. Earl testified that he did 
not know of any promulgated industry standards, and explained "it's all in my 
experience, but in my years of riding is where I get my opinion." (R. at 958, p. 
24 ). The questions about promulgated industry standards turned out to be trick 
questions, as RMO's expert, Rex Walker, later confirmed in his deposition that 
there were no publications or regulations or any promulgated set standards for gaps 
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between horses and that the determination of distances is gained from experience. 
(R. at 1066, and 1084 p. 60 lines 1-9). 
b) Mr. Earl's Opinions Are Reliable. 
Rule 702(b) states: 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
may serve as the basis for expert testimony only if 
there is a threshold showing that the principles or 
methods that are underlying in the testimony 
( 1) are reliable, 
(2)are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
(3)have been reliably applied to the facts. 24 
The advisory committee note to Rule 702 provides: 
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert 
testimony contained in the federal rule. Unlike the federal rule, 
however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the testimony is 
required to make only a ''threshold" showing. That "threshold" 
requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for 
testimony to be admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably 
correct. 
In applying Rule 702(b ), "the degree of scrutiny that should be applied to 
expert testimony by trial judges is not so rigorous to be satisfied by only scientific 
or other specialized principles or methods that are free of controversy or that meet 
any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test reliability."25 In fact, "only a threshold 
24 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702(b) 
25 Eskelson v. Davis Hospital and Medical Center, 2010 UT 59, ,r 12,242 P.3d 
762. 
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showing of reliability" is required in evaluation of Mr. Earl's opinion.26 "That 
'threshold' requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for 
the testimony to be admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct."27 
The only reason that the court found that Mr. Earl's opinions lack a 
''threshold showing" for "a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability" as 
required under rule 702, is what the court considered as his lack of experience in 
commercial horseback trail rides. The issue is addressed in Section 702(a) 
argument. The trial court made no finding that the actual testimony was unreliable. 
In fact, to do so would be nearly impossible since his testimony is consistent with 
every other "horse person" who provided testimony in the case. (See Section II 
above). His testimony regarding standard of care has not been disputed. 
The court did not make a decision to strike Mr. Earl's declaration or any 
portion of it during the hearing, yet, RMO included it in the order they prepared. 
The order wrongly concludes that Mr. Earl's declaration contradicts his deposition 
testimony. Specifically, the order states: 
26Jd. 
Mr. Earl contradicts his prior deposition testimony by stating that, '[i]t 
is my opinion that it was Ashley Wright's failure to stop and close the 
gaps at the point when she passed the hikers that caused Ms. 
Penunuri's horse to accelerate. . .. The Court rejects Mr. Earl's 
contradictory testimony and finds that it only further demonstrates the 
unreliability and speculative nature of his opinion. (R. at 1539). 
27 Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, LLC v. Los Angeles Dept of Water and Power, 2012 
UT App 20, at 33 269 P.3d 980 (emphasis in original). 
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The statement is only contradictory to Mr. Earl's prior deposition testimony when 
RMO cherry-picked phrases out of the deposition as discussed supra. It is entirely 
consistent with a non-cherry-picked version of the deposition. In particular, it is 
consistent with the following deposition testimony, where Mr. Earl when asked by 
RMO what caused Ms. Penunuri to fall, answered the following question: 
Q. Just for clarification, what do you believe caused Lisa to fall off the 
horse? 
A. I believe the large gaps, which allowed the horse to accelerate 
unexpectedly, that she lost her seating and fell. (R. at 946, p. 72, lines 
14-18). 
In regards to what the guide Ms. Wright could have done, Mr. Earl testified: 
Q. And as she bends around the corner, is it a breach in the standard of 
care not to have waited, at that point, to have gotten all of those horses 
back together? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So at that point, even if they were three or four horse lengths apart, the 
fact of the matter is, she had to get them back to one or two right? 
A. Yes, in my opinion, she should have. 
Q. . . . It's a breach in her duty not to have gotten those back to one and 
two before she came around the danger, before she saw -
A. After seeing the people and knowing there was danger, yes. 
Q. And so she breached her duty, at that point? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And at that point, she's negligent; is that correct? 
A. That would be correct. (R. at 941-942, p.89-90). 
Mr. Earl's declaration does not contradict his prior testimony, it merely 
summarizes his opinion regarding causation. 
VI. The Trial Court Erred When It Granted RMO's Costs For Depositions 
Where RMO Could Have Obtained the Same Evidence Through Less 
Expensive Means. 
The trial court erred when it determined that RMO was entitled to the 
deposition costs in the amount of $2,577.32, together with post judgment interests, 
when the same evidence could have been obtained through less expensive means. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 54(d) governs costs. The relevant portion ofRule 54 provides:" 
The party who claims costs ... [must] file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiants knowledge . 
. . the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the 
proceeding. 28 
The Supreme Court of Utah determined that a party: 
seeking costs must show the depositions were so essential to the case 
that the information provided by the deposition could not have been 
obtained through less expensive means of discovery. 29 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that there is a distinction to be 
understood between legitimate and taxable costs and other expenses 
of litigation which may ever be so necessary, but are not taxable 
costs.30 
2s Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 54(b) 
29 Jensen v. Sawyer, 2005 UT 81, at if 139, 
30 /datifl41,FN 14 
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Costs are only those that are absolutely necessary. 31 RMO contended they needed 
Ms. Penunuri's deposition as it was: 
used in summary judgment briefs to establish that she had been 
presented with and signed the Horseback Riding Release which 
warned her of the "Inherent Risks" associated with horseback riding; 
and that she was not confused by or sought any clarification 
concerning the language of the Horseback Riding Release; that she 
was of legal age and capacity to execute the Horseback Riding 
Release. Plaintifrs deposition was also used to establish her version 
of the facts leading up to and including her fall from the horse. (R. at 
1444). 
These facts from Ms. Penunuri could have been obtained through interrogatories 
and the deposition was therefore not essential. 
Kate Fort was a rider on the trail and the mother of Haley Fort; RMO 
contended that: 
Ms. Fort's deposition testimony was used in the parties' summary 
judgment briefing to establish the events leading up to the accident, 
the instructions that were given to participants during the ride and 
facts leading up to Plaintiffs fall. (R. at 1443) 
In regards to Suzanne Moag, RMO claims: 
Ms. Moag's deposition testimony was used in the parties' summary 
judgment briefing to establish that instructions had been given to 
participants on the ride and that RMO's guide Ashley Wright, had 
informed the participants that after the group reached a clearing, she 
would go back to pony Haley Fort's horse the remainder of the ride to 
help keep the group together and to prevent it from stopping to graze. 
(R. at 1443) 
31 Id at ,I130. 
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RMO obtained most of these facts shortly after Ms. Penunuri fell. Ms. Fort and 
Ms. Moag voluntarily filled out an incident form provided to them by RMO. 
There was no reason that RMO could not have made it a declaration or affidavit 
having the same effect as a deposition. There is no reason that the deposition 
could not also have been taken in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 3 l{a)(3) 
Depositions Upon Written Questions. 
During the hearing RMO produced a document. The document revealed 
exactly how unnecessary the depositions were and how easily the evidence could 
have -been obtained through less costly means. The document containing the 
testimony used from these three witnesses and can be found in the record at 14 72-
1476, and attached hereto as Addendum D. The court failed to protect Ms. 
Penunuri from excess and abuses in costs as the information obtained from the 
depositions," and found in Addendum D, could have been obtained through much 
less costly means. The depositions of Ms. Penunuri, Suzanne Moag, and Kate Fort 
were not necessary and the information used in the Motion for Summary Judgment 
certainly could have been obtained through less expensive means. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Penunuri respectfully request that this 
Appellate Court find in her favor and reverse the Summary Judgment Motions, 
allow her to keep her expert, and remand this case for trial. Ms. Penunuri also 
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requests that this Appellate Court find the costs were excessive and strike the costs 
awarded to RMO. 
Respectfully submitted this 11 day of March 2014. 
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Addendum A 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from 
which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or 
the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
@ stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment 
shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third 
party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
@ judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form 
of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
@ parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
@ 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, and 
except as provided in Rule 8(a), every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may,. when the 
justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or 
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for 
review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other 
proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state 
of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within 14 days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with 
the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items 
are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 7 days after service of the 
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and 
the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the 
costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the (i 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof 
in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 21 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
~ party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to 
all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue 
~ of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating 
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and 
@ what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the 
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in 
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or 
® opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a 
@ response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the 
party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
~ other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party 
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of 
@ 
i) 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts 
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b ), a witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact 
~ to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 
@) 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert 
testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods that are underlying in 
the testimony 
(1) are reliable, 
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying principles or 
methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of 
the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert community. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of the 
restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and 
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There 
is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE. 
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal Rule 702 
as it appeared before it was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
.... Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007 amendment to the Rule added that 
i> introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the amended rule does not 
incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed in many respects the 
developments in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and 
clarifies differences between the Utah and federal approaches to expert testimony. 
@ The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to be 
applied to all expert testimony. In this respect, the rule follows federal law as announced in Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like its federal counterpart, Utah's rule assigns 
to trial judges a "gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out unreliable expert testimony. In performing 
their gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with rational 
skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other 
@ specialized principles or methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria 
fashioned to test reliability. The rational skeptic is receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear 
on reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods or techniques may be suitably reliable 
to merit admission into evidence for consideration by the trier of fact. The fields of knowledge which 
may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical", but extend to all 
"specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person 
qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge 
must take care to direct her skepticism to the particular proposition that the expert testimony is 
offered to support. The Daubert court characterized this task as focusing on the "work at hand". 
The practitioner should equally take care that the proffered expert testimony reliably addresses the 
"work at hand", and that the foundation of reliability presented for it reflects that consideration. 
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony. Generally 
accepted principles and methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The nature of the "work 
at hand" is especially important here. It might be important in some cases for an expert to educate 
the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply these principles to the specific 
facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or 
exposition of principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. 
Proposed expert testimony that seeks to set out relevant principles, methods or techniques without 
offering an opinion about how they should be applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most 
instances, more eligible for admission under section (c) than case specific opinion testimony. There 
are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied at a level of considerable 
operational detail that have acquired sufficient general acceptance to merit admission under 
section (c). 
The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the novel vs. non-
novel dichotomy that has served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule 702 jurisprudence. The 
failure to show general acceptance meriting admission under section ( c) does not mean the 
evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability under section (b) must be 
shown by other means. 
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained in the 
federal rule. Unlike the federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the 
testimony is required to make only a "threshold" showing. That "threshold" requires only a basic 
foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible, not that the opinion 
is indisputably correct. When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's 
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is 
unreliable. The amendment is broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing 
principles or methods in the same field of expertise. Contrary and inconsistent opinions may 
simultaneously meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to reconcile - or choose between - the 
different opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic 
challenge to the testimony of every expert, and it is not contemplated that evidentiary hearings will 
be routinely required in order for the trial judge to fulfill his role as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. 
In the typical case, admissibility under the rule may be determined based on affidavits, expert 
reports prepared pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 26, deposition testimony and memoranda of counsel. 
AddendumB 
H. Burt Ringwood, #5787 
A. Joseph Sano, #9925 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 323-2037 
Attorneys for Defendants Sundance Partners, Ltd, 
Sundance Holding, LLC, Sundance Development Corp. 
Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust, and Rocky Mountain 
Outfitters, L. C. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA PENUNURI and BARRY SIEGWART, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD.; 
SUNDANCE HOLDING, LLC: 
SUNDANCE INSTITUTE, INC.; 
ROBERT REDFORD; 
REDFORD 1970 TRUST; 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OUTFITTERS, L.C.; 
and DOES I-X 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING (1) 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REGARDING GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE AND (2) 
DEFENDANTS' ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE SCOTT EARL AS AN 
EXPERT WITNESS, FINAL ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL AND JUDGEMENT 
Civil No.: 080400019 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court, the Honorable Claudia Laycock 
presiding, on January 31, 2014 at 9:00 a.m., for a hearing on (1) Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding Gross Negligence and (2) Alternative Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Exclude Scott Earl as an Expert Witness. Defendants were represented 
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by attorneys H. Burt Ringwood and A. Joseph Sano. Plaintiffs were represented by attorney 
Robert D. Strieper. 
The Court, having fully considered the legal memoranda submitted, the arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised of the issues and law relevant to the pending motions, and for 
the reasons expressed by the Court orally on January 31, 2014 and February 25, 2014 (which are 
incorporated by reference), as well as the theories expressed and argued by Defendants, hereby 
rules as follows: 
I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ,JUDGMENT REGARDING 
GROSS NEGLIGENCE 
A. GROSS NEGLIGENCE STANDARD 
There is no dispute between the parties concerning the standard applicable to establishing 
a claim of gross negligence under Utah law. "Gross negligence is the failure to observe even 
slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the 
consequences that may result." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 
P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985). "Recklessness is subsumed in [Utah's] definition of gross 
negligence." Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, 2009 UT 66, ,r 43, 221 P.3d 256. 
"Recklessness includes conduct where 'the actor kn[ ew ], or ha[ d] reason to know, . . . of facts 
which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, 
or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk.,,, Id. at ,r 42 ( quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 500 cmt. a (1965)). See also Doe v. Doe, 878 P.2d 1161, 1163 
n.1 ( explaining that recklessness requires that there be a "strong probability" that harm may 
result). "[T]o carry a claim of gross negligence, [plaintiffs] are required to show conduct that not 
2-
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only demonstrates 'an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another' but also that 'such risk is 
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." Milne v. USA 
Cycling, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1287-88 (D. Utah 2007) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts§ 500 (1965)). 
While ordinarily summary judgment is inappropriate in cases of alleged gross negligence, 
summary judgment can be properly granted where, based on the undisputed facts, "[i]t cannot be 
reasonably asserted that [the defendant] 'show[ed] utter indifference"' towards the plaintiffs 
care. Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc., 2012 UT 37,117,284 P.3d 616. 
B. UNDISPUTED FACTS AS FOUND BY THE COURT 
1. On August 1, 2007, Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri and two friends, Barbara Black and 
Suz.anne Moag, participated in a horseback trail ride at the Sundance Resort located in Provo 
Canyon. 
2. After having dinner at the Sundance Resort, Plaintiff and her friends left for the 
Sundance stables, arriving between 5:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. The horseback trail ride was 
scheduled for 6:00 p.m. 
3. The trail ride at Sundance was operated by Defendant Rocky Mountain Outfitters 
("RMO"). Ashley Wright guided the ride for Plaintiff, her two friends, and two others, Kate Fort 
and her daughter, Haley. 
4. Ashley Wright grew up around horses and worked as a trail guide with RMO 
from the summer of2004 through the fall of 2008. 
5. Ashley, as with all of RMO's guides, was CPR certified and received training at 
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the beginning of each season on horseback trail guiding. During her deposition, Ashley testified: 
Q. What does the training, the yearly training, entail? 
A. Everything. 
Q. Meaning? 
A. Getting to know the horses, knowing the trails, how to tack/untack, how to do 
arena lessons. Care and maintenance of the horses. How to take out guided tours, 
dealing with guests. Safety reasons. Precautions, I guess. 
(A. Wright Dep., pp. 12-13, Ex. 2 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
6. Before embarking on the trail ride, Plaintiff and the other participants received a 
Horseback Riding Release which, among other things, warned of the risks involved in horseback 
riding. In pertinent part, the Release states: 
I, the undersigned, . . . understand that horseback riding, sleigh riding or horse 
drawn wagons (collectively ·"Horseback riding,,) involve SIGNIFICANT RISK 
OF SERIOUS PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR EVEN 
DEA TH. The risks include NATURAL, MAN-MADE, ENVIRONMENT AL 
CONDITIONS AND INHERENT RISKS, including changing weather, mud, 
rocks, variations in steepness, terrain, natural and man-made obstacles, equipment 
failure and the negligence of others. "Inherent risk" with regard to equine or 
livestock activities means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part 
of equine or livestock activities, which may include: (a) the propensity of the 
animal to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or 
around them; (b) the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside 
stimulation such as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or 
other animals; ( c) collisions with other animals or objects; or ( d) the potential of a 
participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the 
participant or others, such as failing to maintain control over the animal or not 
acting within his or her ability. 
(Horseback Riding Release, Ex. 3 to Defs., Mem. in Supp. of MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
7. Plaintiff acknowledged having signed the Horseback Riding Release, but testified 
4-
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that she only "scanned through it [and] didn't read thoroughly through it." (L. Penunuri Dep., 
pp. 121-22, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
8. In addition to the warnings listed in the Horseback Riding Release, two signs 
were posted at Sundance, one in the building where guests sign the Horseback Riding Release 
and the other near the horse arena; both signs provide further warnings to participants of the 
inherent risks associated with horseback riding. 
9. After Plaintiff and her group finished filling out paperwork, they gathered outside 
near the horses. Plaintiff's friend, Suzanne Moag, recalls RMO's guide, Ashley, giving Lisa and 
Haley general instructions during that time. Suzanne testified: 
Q. During that time do you recall what instructions or anything that was given 
before the group set out on the ride? 
A. I believe Ashley told Lisa and Haley gave, them some instructions. Barb and 
I just asked about the temperament of the horses and the names of them. 
Q. What kind of instructions do you recall Ashley giving Lisa and Haley? 
A. Just about mounting the horse, and I remember when we started out, the 
horses, Haley's horse and Lisa's horse kept eating. 
Q. Grazing? 
A. Yes; and it was very difficult for Haley to keep the horse's head up. 
Q. Do you recall any instructions given by Ashley discouraging them from letting 
the horse's graze? 
A. Yes. I remember Ashley saying "pull up," "pull up." And Haley was very 
small and she was not strong enough to keep yanking the horse's head up. 
Q. Any instructions about, you know, using the reins, doing this will make the 
horse go left or right or anything like that? 
A. Oh, I'm sure, but I can't recall it. I don't listen to that. 
5-
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(S. Moag Dep., pp. 19-20, Ex. 6 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
10. Kate Fort similarly recalls Ashley giving general instructions before embarking 
on the ride. She testified: 
Q. What's the next thing you remember? 
A. Getting in a line. "Once you 're on the horse, lean the reins this way to go 
right, this way to go left, and don't let them eat." You know, you got a little bit of 
instruction. 
(K. Fort Dep., p. 22, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
11. Ashley, the RMO guide, led the group and was in front during the entire ride. As 
the group headed out from the Sundance stables, Haley, Kate and Lisa were the first three riders, 
with Barbara and Susan in the back. (A. Wright Dep., 38:13-16, Ex. 2 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. 
ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
12. About 45 minutes into the ride, the group came to the Stewart Falls Meadow. At 
that point, the order of the riders changed, with Barbara and Suzanne directly behind Ashley, 
followed by Kate Fort, her daughter Haley, and Lisa. (See A. Wright Dep., 40:2-12, Ex. 2 to 
Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Neglience.) 
13. After departing from the Stewart Falls Meadow, Lisa and Haley struggled to keep 
their horses from grazing, which in turn caused their horses to lag behind slightly. Lisa testified 
that, at that point, she was "still trying to get the hang of the horse grazing." (See L. Penunuri 
Dep., 138:7-8, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) Kate Fort testified: 
Q. Were there any problems with any of the riders getting too far behind the 
others? 
A. Once the order changed - up to Stewart Falls, we were pretty much in line. 
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Nobody really lagged behind, but once the order changed, there were definitely 
stretches where some were further behind than others, specifically Haley and 
Lisa. 
(K. Fort Dep., 40:13-19, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) Ms. Fort 
further testified: 
Q. So were there any points where, you know, you weren't able to see Haley? 
A. There was never a point where I wasn't able to see her. 
Q. Okay. 
A. There were times where I would definitely encourage her to yank on the reins 
to get the horse's head up to keep it moving. "Come on, baby. You've got to 
keep up with the group." But never a point where I couldn't see her. 
Q. Was Lisa having problems with her horse grazing, too? 
A. Yes. 
(K. Fort Dep., 40:23-25; 41:1-10, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
14. Ms. Fort testified that during the ride RMO's guide, Ashley, instructed the riders, 
"Pull up on the reins. Don't let them eat." (K. Fort Dep., 41:20-22, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in 
Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
15. Regarding the distance between her horse, Haley's horse and Plaintiff's horse, 
Ms. Fort testified: 
... We continued on the rest of the trail ride. I'm repeatedly turning around, 
specifically to check on my daughter, noticing - - you know, she was still having 
trouble with her horse, as was [Plaintiff], and they were both lagging behind, so 
Haley would have been a number of horse lengths behind my horse, and Plaintiff 
a number behind Haley. 
Nothing else is really notable to the point where Lisa fell off .... 
(K. Fort Dep., 42:2-10, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
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16. In an effort to keep the group together, Ashley testified that she had been 
"slowing down the whole ride." (A. Wright Dep., 67:8-13, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. 
ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
17. When that did not work because of Haley being unable to keep her horse from 
grazing, Ashley informed the group that they would be stopping at a clearing in about 100 feet so 
that she could go back and take the lead rope of Haley's horse and pony it the rest of the way. 
18. As Ashley was turning around to pony Haley's horse, Plaintiff fell off the back of 
her horse. 
19. Regarding her fall from the horse, Plaintiff testified: 
Q .... Why don't you describe what you remember about the fall. 
A. Okay. I remember being on the horse, and we were beginning the climb, and 
then Haley's horse grazed - - stopped to graze. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then her - - I guess - - you know, my horse was stopped behind hers, and 
my horse started going, and it was - - it was a rougher ride than I remember 
having had before, other than, you know, with other grazing episodes my horse 
would, you know, kind of giddyup a little faster than it had been going, because 
Haley's horse would start up and then mine would start up, too, and then would 
slow down. And this particular incident, it seemed even rougher than, you know, 
the giddyup that I had gotten in other stops. And then I don't remember anything 
until I was on the ground. 
(L. Penunuri Dep., pp. 114-115, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
20. On January 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants for injuries she 
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sustained as a result of her fall and alleged claims of negligence and gross negligence.• 
21. On November 30, 2009, Plaintiff designated Scott Earl as an expert witness 
regarding horse behavior and the dangers associated with riding horses. 
22. In his expert report, Mr. Earl expresses several opinions based on his review of 
the depositions and other discovery materials in this case. 
23. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that there is no evidence in this case 
indicating that RMO's guide, Ashley, exercised no care or acted in willful disregard for the care 
of others. Mr. Earl testified: 
Q. Is there anything that you've seen in the facts of this case, as you W1derstand 
it, that would indicate that Ashley Wright acted with no care at all? 
A. No. 
(S. Earl Dep., 71 :24-25; 72:1-2, Ex. 10 to Defs.' Mot for Summ. J. Re: Gross Negligence.) Mr. 
Earl further testified: 
Q. Is there anything that you see in the record that indicates that Ashley acted 
intentionally or - -
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. - - in willful disregard for the care - -
A. No. 
Q. Is there anything in the report that would indicate to you that she acted with no 
care? 
A. No. 
(S. Earl Dep., 87:10-17, Ex. IO to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Re: Gross Negligence.) 
I On March 30, 2010, this Court entered an order dismissing all of Plaintiffs' ordinary negligence-based claims as a 
matter oflaw, leaving only Plaintiffs' claim for gross negligence. The Court's ruling was subsequently upheld on 
appeal. 
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24. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that he does not know what caused 
Plaintiffs horse to accelerate, but gave several possible reasons. He stated: 
A. There's several factors that could have - - or, in my opinion, several things 
that could have startled that horse and caused it to start running, going around a 
blind curve, not seeing the other horses at the time, being a distance, wanting to 
catch up. I'm not even saying it was startled. 
Q. Just may have wanted to catch up? 
A. Yes, and they will accelerate to catch up. 
(S. Earl Dep., 61:4-15, Ex. 10 to Defs.' MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
25. Mr. Earl has testified that there is no way to predict when a horse might 
accelerate. During his deposition, Mr. Earl stated: 
A. . . . Quick acceleration. 
Q. Is there any way to predict that? 
A. There's no way to predict any ofit. It's an animal. You can minimize the risk 
by doing certain things. 
Q. But there's always that inherent risk with an animal, you don't know what 
they're going to do? 
A. That's right. 
(S. Earl Dep., 14:11-22, Ex. 10 to Defs.' MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) He further testified: 
Q. Is it possible that [Plaintiff] fell off the horse, in your opinion, because - - I 
mean, is it possible that Lisa could have prevented the horse from trotting? 
A. If she knew what she was doing, yes. 
Q. She could have, like she did many times on the ride, and not fall off the horse 
when it accelerated? 
A. It's always possible when a horse accelerates, in my experience, and many 
times when a horse accelerates, it's usually unexpected, and the most experienced 
I 
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riders can come awfully close to falling off. 
Q. That's just one of the inherent risks of riding a horse? 
A. That's part ofit. When a horse accelerates, you better be ready. 
(S. Earl Dep., 74:6-25; 75:1-13, Ex. 10 to Defs.' MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
C. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence upon which reasonable minds could conclude that 
Defendants' guide, Ashley Wright, exercised no care. Nor have Plaintiffs presented any 
evidence to show that Ashley Wright knew or had reason to know of facts that would have 
created a high degree of risk of physical hann to Plaintiff Penunuri, but deliberately proceeded to 
act, or failed to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk. See Daniels, 2009 UT 
66 at 1 42 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 500 cmt. a (1965)). 
In this case, Plaintiffs designated Scott Earl as their expert witness. While Mr. Earl has 
been excluded from offering expert opinion testimony (see infra), even Mr. Earl has testified that 
he was aware of no evidence in this case showing that Ashley Wright exercised no care or acted 
with willful disregard. The undisputed facts establish that Ashley Wright, among other things, 
lead Plaintiff Penunuri and the other guests during the trail ride, that she attempted to slow down 
the ride to keep the riders closer together, and (when that did not work because Haley's horse 
had stopped to graze) gathered the other riders in a clearing to make room for her to go back and 
take the lead rope of Haley's uncooperative horse to pony it the rest of the way. Based on the 
undisputed facts of this case, the Court finds it cannot be reasonable asserted that Defendants 
"showed utter indifference." See Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37, ,r17 (finding that summary judgment on 
a claim of gross negligence was appropriately granted where the undisputed facts established that 
I 
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the plaintiff would be unable to show the defendant acted with utter indifference). 
The Court rejects Plaintiffs' assertion that "gross negligence" may be established merely 
by showing that Ashley Wright failed to follow all of the guidelines suggested in Defendant 
Rocky Mountain Outfitters' employee manual, as internal guidelines or recommendations do not 
establish a tort law duty or standard of care. See Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy 
Dist., 2013 UT 59, 744 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (October 1, 2013). 
In addition to the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that summary judgment in favor 
of the Defendants is appropriate because Plaintiffs have presented no evidence beyond 
speculation concerning causation. To succeed on their claim, Plaintiffs must establish that 
Defendants' gross negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff Penunuri's injury. Under 
Utah law, proximate cause is defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result 
would not have occurred." Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). When 
the issue of proximate cause is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law. See Harline 
v. Barker, 912 P.2d 443 (Utah 1996). 
It is alleged that Plaintiff Penunuri fell and was injured because her horse accelerated 
unexpectedly. No one knows what caused the horse to accelerate unexpectedly. Plaintiffs' own 
expert, Scott Earl, testified that there are multiple reasons why Plaintiff Penunuri' s horse could 
have accelerated unexpectedly, including "going around a blind curve, not seeing the other 
horses at the time, being a distance, [or] wanting to catch up," and he testified that there is no 
way to predict when a horse might accelerate, it is one of the "inherent risks" of riding a horse. 
(See S. Earl Dep., 61:8-15; 14:15-22, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for MSJ Regarding 
1 
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Gross Negligence.) Plaintiffs have argued that what caused the horse to accelerate is not 
relevant, and even speculate that there were "probably multiple causes." (See Pits.' Opp'n 
Mern., p. 16.) Plaintiffs seem to take the position that, regardless of what caused the horse to 
accelerate, Defendants' guide should have prevented the horse from acting unpredictably. 
Utah law recognizes that horseback riding involves "inherent risks" that are an integral 
part of equine activities. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201. These risks include, among other 
things, "the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as sounds, 
sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals." See id (emphasis added). 
Because Plaintiff has not, without engaging in impermissible speculation, presented any 
evidence establishing that Defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of the horse's 
unexpected acceleration, as opposed to the various "inherent risks" associated with horseback 
riding, Plaintiffs' claim fails as matter of law. 
II. DEFENDANTS' ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR SUMMARY ,mDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE SCOTT EARL AS AN EXPERT WITNESS 
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CLAIMS OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND RULE 702 
Neither party has directed the Court to a standard of care applicable to commercial 
horseback trail guiding that is fixed by law. Under Utah law, "where a standard of care is not 
'fixed by law,' the determination of the appropriate standard is a factual issue to be resolved by 
the finder of fact." Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821,825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Identification of the proper standard of care is a necessary precondition to assessing the degree 
to which conduct deviates, if at all, from the standard of care - the core test in any claim of gross 
negligence." Berry v. Greater Park City, 2007 UT 87, 'if 30, 171 P.3d 442. In this regard, expert 
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testimony may be helpful in order for the fact finder to determine the defendant's deviation from 
the industry standard. See Wycalis, 780 P.2d at n. 8 ("Where the average person has little 
understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions, expert testimony must 
ordinarily be presented to establish the standard of care.") 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of ~vidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony. 
The Rule, which is divided into three sections, provides: 
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis 
for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or 
methods that are underlying in the testimony 
(b )( 1) are reliable, 
(b )(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
(b)(3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
( c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying 
principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of 
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant 
expert community. 
Utah R. Evid. 702. 
To protect against the improper admission of expert testimony, this Court has been given 
a "gatekeeper" responsibility "to screen out unreliable expert testimony" and to approach 
"proposed expert testimony with 'rational skepticism"' as it assesses such testimony. See Utah 
R. Evid. 702, 2011 Advisory Committee Note. 
1 
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B. UNDISPUTED FACTS AS FOUND BY THE COURT 
1. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were grossly negligent "when 
[Defendants'] employees acted in reckless disregard to the public safety by failing to keep the 
herd together, causing the horses to act in a very dangerous yet predictable manner." (Compl., 1 
36). 
2. On November 30, 2009, Plaintiff designated Scott Earl as a liability expert 
witness with "extensive knowledge of horses and horse behavior." (Pits.' Liability Expert 
Designation, p. 2, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) 
3. In his expert report, Mr. Earl expresses several opinions based on his review of 
the depositions and other discovery materials in this case. (See generally Scott Earl Report, Ex. 
2 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) 
4. At the time of his deposition, Mr. Earl owned six horses and testified that he has 
had horses his entire adult life. (See S. Earl Dep., 5:6-13, Ex. 3.) 
5. Mr. Earl has never owned a trail guiding business, but testified that as a teenager 
in the early 1980s, he worked one summer as a ranch hand for Desert Springs Country Club and 
two summers as a trail guide for Jeremy Ranch. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified: 
Q. Tell me about your experience as a [trail] guide. 
A. What experience do you want to know? I was a ranch hand for Desert Springs 
Country Club, in Grantsville, in 1982. I was a horse guide for the Jeremy Ranch, 
1983 and 1984. 
*** 
Q. Explain when and what your duties and responsibilities were. 
A. In 1983 and '84, and my responsibilities were taking people on guided horse 
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rides. 
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Q. Was that summer employment? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
{ ... \ 
w 
Q. Let me ask you, since you left Jeremy Ranch, and that would have been back 
in '84? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you acted as a guide since that time? 
A. No. 
(S. Earl Dep., 6:5-9; 10:11-16; 20:12-16, Ex. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) 
6. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that he was not familiar with the industry 
standards applicable to the trail guiding business. He testified: 
Q. Can you tell me what the industry standard would be with respect to the 
number of guides that are required? 
A. I don't know the industry standard. I think that depends on your group of 
horses and the group of riders. And I'm not even sure there is an industry 
standard. 
*** 
Q. So let me ask you, in terms of trail guides and running a trail, you've never 
owned a trail guide business; right? 
A. No. 
Q. With respect to trail guides, there's really not - - is there a publication or 
regulations or something that I can go to to figure out what the industry standard 
would be? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Do you have any idea how we would determine what the industry standard 
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would be? 
A. Well, most of it's common sense. And among horse people, it's not that hard 
to figure out what works and doesn't work, but I don't know where you would 
come up with a standard. 
*** 
Q. Do you know of an industry standard with respect to the - -
A. I don't know of any industry standard. 
Q. - -with respect to the gap [between horses], that becomes a problem? 
A. It's all in my experience, but in my years of riding is where I get my opinion 
from. 
(S. Earl Dep., 19:11-17; 20:25; 21:14; 24:3-9, Ex. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative 
MSJ.) 
7. During his deposition, Mr. Earl expressed the opinion that RMO's guide, Ashley 
Wright, had a responsibility to keep gaps from forming between the horses on the trail ride. He 
testified: 
A. . .. - - it was still her responsibility to keep gaps from forming. 
Q. And again, you're not able to point to - - you're not able to tell me where, in 
the industry standards or guidelines, that would indicate that that would be 
negligence, are you? 
A. No. 
Q. That's just based upon your own experience? 
A. It's based upon my experience, and my opinion. 
Q. And that somebody else could obviously not think that's negligent at all; 
right? 
A. Somebody could. Everybody has a different opinion. 
1 
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(S. Earl Dep., 48:7-20, Ex. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) 
C. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the standard of care applicable to commercial 
horseback trail guiding. Plaintiffs also bear the burden of establishing that it was Defendants' 
gross negligence that caused Plaintiff Penunuri' s horse to accelerate unexpectedly, resulting in 
her falling to the ground. Because the standard of care applicable to commercial trail guiding 
and the issue of what caused Plaintiffs horse to accelerate are both outside the knowledge and 
experience of the average layperson, the Court finds that Plaintiffs must present expert opinion 
testimony on these issues. See Wycalis, 180 P.2d 821, n. 8. 
Plaintiffs designated Scott Earl as their expert to testify concerning the applicable 
standard of care and causation. According to Plaintiffs' Liability Expert Witness Designation, 
Mr. Earl "is a Sheriff with Salt Lake County and liaison with the mounted posse and member of 
the Salt Lake mounted patrol who has extensive knowledge of horses and horse behavior." (See 
Pits.' Liability Witness Designation, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) The 
fact that Mr. Earl is generally knowledgeable about horses is not disputed. Mr. Earl, however, 
has very limited knowledge and experience concerning commercial horseback trail guiding. 
Over thirty years ago, as a teenager, Mr. Earl spent one summer working as a ranch hand 
at Desert Springs Country Club, and then spent two summers working as a trail guide at Jeremy 
Ranch. Mr. Earl's last experience working as a trail guide was while working at Jeremy Ranch 
during the summer of 1984. In addition, Mr. Earl repeatedly testified during his deposition that 
he is not familiar with the industry standards applicable to the trail guiding business. He also 
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testified that his opinions are based on what he believes to be common sense. 
Under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Earl is not 
qualified to render expert opinion testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to 
commercial horseback trail guiding. Based on his lack of experience in commercial horseback 
trail guiding, the Court also finds Plaintiffs have failed to make the "threshold showing" that Mr. 
Earl's opinions have "a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability," as required under 
Rule 702. The Court finds that Mr. Earl's opinions consist of his own subjective beliefs, and that 
his opinions will not assist the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue in 
this case. The Court finds that Mr. Earl's experience with horses is largely limited to his own 
personal recreation. He has not owned or managed a commercial horseback trail guiding 
business and, except for brief summer employment as a teenager thirty years ago, has never 
guided a commercial trail ride made up of riders with unknown experience and abilities. 
Regarding the issue of causation specifically, Mr. Earl gave sworn deposition testimony 
that there were several factors that could have caused Plaintiff Penunuri's horse to accelerate and 
cause her to fall, a number of which are recognized "inherent risks" associated with horseback 
riding. (See supra.) In a post-deposition affidavit, Mr. Earl contradicts his prior deposition 
testimony by stating that, "[i]t is my opinion that it was Ashley Wright's failure to stop and close 
the gaps at the point when she passed the hikers that caused Ms. Penunuri's horse to accelerate." 
(S. Earl Deel., ,r 19, Ex. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) The Court rejects Mr. 
Earl's contradictory testimony and finds that it only further demonstrates the unreliability and 
speculative nature of his opinions. 
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the standard of care may be established 
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by evidence that Defendants' guide, Ashley Wright, failed to follow RMO's internal guidelines. 
See Jenkins, 2013 UT 59; 744 Adv. Rep. 8 (October 1, 2013) (holding that the alleged breach of 
internal guidelines cannot be used to establish a tort duty and explaining that expert testimony 
must be presented if the subject matter is beyond the normal experience or knowledge of the 
average layperson); see also, Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Ins. Agency, 309 P.3d 267, 274 
(Utah Ct. App. 2013) ("Establishing an industry standard requires more than evidence of a 
particular company's rules and policies. [ ... ] Rather, the standard of conduct which the 
community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, 
good or bad, of the particular actor.") (internal quotations omitted.)) 
Having found that Mr. Earl's opinions fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 702, and 
having found that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden of establishing the standard of care and 
causation without expert testimony, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claim for gross negligence 
must be dismissed as a matter of law. 
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs' argument (asserted for the first time at the hearing on 
January 31, 2014) that they may utilize Defendants' expert witness, Rex Walker, to establish the 
applicable standard of care. Plaintiffs never asserted in their opposition memoranda that they 
intended to use Mr. Walker's testimony in their case-in-chief to establish the standard of care. 
Instead, Plaintiffs relied upon their designated expert, Scott Earl, and attempted to defend his 
qualifications to opine regarding the standard of care. Thus, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' 
argument that they may use Defendants' expert to satisfy their burden in establishing the 
applicable standard of care. 
Pursuant to the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED 
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ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Gross Negligence is 
GRANTED; 
2. Defendants' Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Exclude 
Scott Earl as an Expert Witness is GRANTED; 
3. Summary Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, and 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and all claims contained therein or arising therefrom, alleged or which 
could have been alleged, are dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits, no cause of action; and 
4. Final Judgment, from which an appeal can be taken, is hereby entered in favor of 
Defendants and against Plaintiffs for costs incurred, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. S4(d)(l), in the 
amount of $2,577.32, together with post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 
Approved as to Form: 
(Counsel declined to sign) 
Robert D. Strieper 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
[Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of this Order] 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of August, 2014 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order Granting (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding 
Gross Negligence and (2) Defendants' Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Exclude Scott Earl as an Expert Witness, Final Order of Dismissal and 
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Judgment was served by the method indicated below, to the following: 
001781.00009 
Robert D. Strieper 
STRIEPER LAW FIRM 
2366 Logan Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) E-file email 
/s/ Michelle Peters 
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H. Burt Ringwood, #5787 
A. Joseph Sano, #9925 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
102 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (80 I) 323-2037 
Attorneys for Defendants Sundance Partners, Ltd., 
Sundance Holding, LLC, Sundance Development Corp. 
Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust, and Rocky Mountain 
Outfitters, L. C. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA PENUNURI and BARRY SIEGWART,) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER REGARDING 
) DETERMINATION OF COSTS 
vs.) 
) 
SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD.;) 
SUNDANCE HOLDING, LLC: ) 
SUNDANCE INSTITUTE, INC.; ) 
ROBERT REDFORD; ) 
REDFORD 1970 TRUST;) Civil No.: 080400019 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OUTFITTERS, L.C.;) 
and DOES I-X) Judge Claudia Laycock 
) 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court, the Honorable Claudia Laycock presiding, on 
June 19, 2014 at 1 :30 p.m., for a hearing regarding Determination of Costs. Defendants were 
represented by attorney A.J. Sano. Plaintiffs were represented by attorney Robert D. Strieper. 
.- 0015,07 
The Court, having fully considered the legal memoranda submitted, the arguments of counsel, and 
being fully advised of the issues and relevant law, and for the reasons expressed by the Court orally 
at the hearing on June 19, 2014 (which is incorporated by reference), hereby rules as follows: 
Regarding the recovery of depositions costs, as a general rule, a party may recover deposition costs 
as long as the "trial court is persuaded that [the depositions] were taken in good faith and, in the 
light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and presentation of the 
case." Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, 16, 16 P.3d 549. See also Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 
774 (Utah 1980) ("a majority of this Court has approved the taxing as costs the talcing of 
depositions, but subject to the limitation that the trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good 
faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and 
presentation of the case.") "[D]eposition costs can be recoverable if the trial court determines that 
the deposition was essential to the case, either because the deposition was used in some meaningful 
way at trial or because the development of the case was of such a complex nature that the 
information provided by the deposition could not have been obtained through less expensive means 
of discovery.") 
In this case, Defendants seek the deposition costs of Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri ($840.09), Kate Fort 
($493.07), Suzanne Moag ($754.56), and Scott Earl ($452.60), as well as the statutory witness fee 
for Kate Fort ($18.50) and Scott Earl ($18.50). 1 
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds no evidence that any of the above depositions were not 
taken in good faith. The Court further finds that each of the depositions were used in a meaningful 
way in Defendants' motions for summary judgment and were necessary to development of this 
complex case. With respect to Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri, her deposition was used to establish the facts 
1 
surrounding the accident and her knowing and voluntary asset to the pre-injury release she signed 
prior to embarking on the horseback trail ride. Regarding Kate Fort and Susan Moag, the Court 
finds that their depositions were used meaningfully by Defendants to establish that there was no 
evidence Defendants' guide exercised no care or acted with utter indifference toward the safety of 
those on the trail ride. Concerning Scott Earl, the Court finds that his deposition was used 
meaningfully and extensively by Defendants in establishing that he was aware of no evidence that 
would support Plaintiffs' gross negligence claim and that he lacked the expertise necessary to render 
opinion testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to the commercial horseback trail 
guiding industry. 
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUGED AND DECREED that Defendants be awarded 
deposition costs and witness fees in the total amount of $2,577.32, together with post-judgment 
interest as allowed by law. 
This order concludes the final issue in this matter. This is a final order, and this case is now ready 
for appeal. 
Approved as to Form: 
Declined to sign 
Robert D. Strieper 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
!Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of this Order) 
.,. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of July, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Regarding Determination of Costs was served by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Robert D. Strieper () U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Strieper Law Firm ( ) Hand Delivered 
2366 Logan Way ( ) Overnight Mail 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 () Facsimile 
(X) E-file email 
Isl Michelle Peters 
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Defendants' Memorandum of Costs included additional costs and witness fees. However, prior to the hearing, 
Defendants stipulated to the withdrawal of all but the costs and witness fee listed above. 
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AddendumD 
DEPOSITION EXCERPTS FROM DEFENDANTS' 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIEFING 
I. ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE: 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summnry 
,Judgment and Dcclnrntory Relief 
I. Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri: 
'l l'l,ti111i1T Lisa Pcn~:mri was 48 .n:ar:. olJ :,t the time of the ac.:1."iuc11t. (~5; 
I.. l>enunuri l>cp .• 5:'25, l:x. -1; ;,_~ i!!;ll!. Rckasc. J-:x. I .1 
3. During her dcpositit,n, Pluintiff confirmed signinf the Rdl!asl' prior to the 
horscb:1ck ride (~~ I.. Penunuri Dcp., 121: 17-19, Ex. 4 ) Plaintiff also testified th:11 she ~ig,u:d 
1h1..· ltckas1: ,·olunt:irilr. (Sec id., 129:9-11. Ex. -L) 
"· 
Pl:iimiff furllll·r testilicd thnt 01 no time did sh\! nsk for nny cl.irilicaiion 
regarding. an, ol'thl.' km;_.:u;!gl' in the Release. (~cc uL. 130:10-11. E:,,;. •I.) 
L:nlikc thl! 111i11rn duld in Hawkins, Plaintiff was nn ,duh, 48 ~-l!ars \,Id, when she 
si~Jh:d the Rclc.'ilii.: :ir~rcdng to w:fr,c n:ld indtmnil)' the Dd"i:ndnnts for any cl,:ims n::suhing 
from her particip:llion in the lll,rscb,11:k ri<k. (Sci.! r.. l'cnunuri D.:p., 5:25. L~ 1: 17-19 Fx. 4: '>l'C 
u!so. lh.-l1.":1SI.', Ex. I.) Pl.iimiff w.is prcs-:1\lcd with the Rclcas~ and h:nf ;111 oppurtunit;. 111 n.::1,I 
I :!9.9-11; IJ0-10-1 :!, b. •I.) Put simply, 1wnc of the public policy ..:unsid1."r,1titms :11 issue in 
I lawkins ;ire prcs1.·n1 in lhis c-,,si:. 
Uc:cnusc l'lni111iff has prc:-l'nlcd no public policy that would render the Rclc.isc she 
siltrll!tl um·111i.>rccahlc, Plaintiff:;' :\foli11n liu Partial Sumnwry JuJgm,:nt and Dccl:ir:11ory Rclid 
.sht,uld he denied. 
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II. GROSS NEGLIGENCE: 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Sumnrn111 Judgment Regarding 
Plaintiffs' Gross Negligence Claim 
1 . Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri: 
1,. 011 Augu:;1 I, 2007, bt"lnr..: cmharkin~ \lll !he lmil ride, l'l.1i111iff :md lhc ullu:r 
p:1r1idp:m11 n·cdnd :i I t11r,-chnck Riding Rclcac;c which, union,; 011,~r 1hing-., wrimct.l ,if lht: risks 
in\"olw,J in hursdmck rilling. In pcninem p:m, lhc Rcli:ase :;t;ues: 
l, 1hc unt.lcrsiHnCll, ... 1111-.fom:m,l 1h1n lmr:.ch11ck riJinlJ, sleigh titling ur hur:.c 
,lr:1wll \\,lgl)n:. (coll..:c1i-.cl) ··ttmscbu.:k ritlin~") in..,uh..: SIGNIFIC,\N I RISK 
OF Sl:RIOt:S Pt:RSO~t\l. l~JIIR Y. PROPElfl'Y DAMAUE UR EVE~ 
iJl:ATII. "11w risks i1~cluJc r-;,\ fl iH:\I.. "'·1AN-~l,\DE, l:NVllto:'\!\IE~T,'\I. 
CO~l>ITIONS 1\N'I) l~IIER::t,ff RISKS. i11clu1ling chnnginti wc111hcr, mml. 
ro1:ks. -.11ri,11ions in ~h:cpn.:!t:;, l:::r .1:n. :1.11urol ;1ml m,111-ma,!,• ob-..1ud,:s. c,1uip111::m 
f:iilun: :md 1l11: 1:c1:lit:i.:111.:c or ,,tta:h. ·:111hcr..:111 ri,.J<'. .• \'l.i!luc1:,111~ .. 111 c,111i11;.- .1n 
Jj,:\·stu~·k...'!!o:li.,.iti,,;;>JU<:,1ns tl!C1,: 11iuw\."r~ nr c11mli1111n'l_whid1 arc ,111 in1t:11ral r:trt 
1)t NUinc Cir Ji'"c~1111.:~ :icth·ili.:,, ,,h1d1_ mu,· _include:: 1a,_!!!£.J,mm:n,i1,.:.if !he 
a11i11111I 111 hd111\"c in_ "'•"~.1h:i1 r.1.1,· 1c:.ult in iniury._h:11111, 1:1 Jca1h.1t1Jh:1~1111, 1111111 
;1h1uml •lh·1•r 11'1 \he unprcJr.:tabilil\" nt_the_ aninml'5 :cac1i,,n 10_{1\Usidi; 
:;1iumL:11ion sud: .,;, suulllls, _s~dil;!L!lll!Y~!ll~lh...-.!1!!~- 11nt;11111!ii!L.<1~jcc1i~111$, 
n.:r,1,ms ur 1llhl.'r ;111im,1ls;Jc). ,:r,lli~iom with other :mim:11~ nr ol'F;:H: 11r.11ll_1hi: 
pqL~llliJ•l nf :1.n:.ir.tidpmll 111 ncl i11 :!J!':".!dW£111 m.mncr tl,::1 g,:"· c,11uril .. !t'-:. t'L!.!tlm1 
to.J1w .. m1r.lil.irn1U1.\!C 01ht;r.~,.liu•h..i\:-.. fojlj111t l\!.!lli!iJ11:1jn cuntrul owr !lu.: illl!IIIJ!l.ill 
m1Lm;.!im: within l:b ur h1.:r ,1hilit~·. 
ti hmchack Riding llclca:ic, l:x. 3) (untlcrhnc 1.:mplmsis aJJi:t.lJ. 
i. l'l:1intiff ;1clmtJ\\'!,:Ji;t.:! h:wi:lg signed 1hc I llirs,:had: Ridini Release, bu1 h:stilicd 
1h,u sh,: only •·::c.um,:d lhh•u~h ii f:iuJI Ji,ln'l re.id 1hurn11ghly 1hrm1gh it.'' (I. l'c:nunuri lkp .. 
20 Rcgardinu her foll from lhc horse, Pl11in1iff1cslilic,I: 
Q. . . \\"h,:, d,111·1 )"UU J1:s1:1ibc wl1o11 yuu 1c111c111hcr ab,1u1 the foll, 
:\. Okuy. I remember h~:n~ ,m 1h1: lmro;c, nnd we WL•JL' hl'L'innin1~ the dimh. un:I 
111,in H:1lcr'~ hm<c Cr.llL'd • • s1op1xd It' gmzc. 
(). Okay. 
!\. ,\ml tl11.:n h:r ••I £U,::::; ••you l:nuw, my hursc wa~ i..luppcd b..:himl hi:rs. anti 
Ill)' hvr.;1: >larl,;,I i:oin11. Jill! it w:is • • 11 \\IIS a roul!h~r ride th:u1 I n:111;.;mb;;r 
h,l\'111~ h:1tl before, vthcr 1h11n, you know. wilh olhcr !;:mzin~ cri~ll,lc!o my horse 
would, )'OU l:nnw, kintl of 1,!idJ;,1:p u little l'mil..:r 1111111 it h.i,I 11'!L'll !l'lini;, lll:c,111sc 
J lnlc:, ',; hnr~c ,..-cml,I :.tan up am.I 1h:n mine \\OUiu :.larl up, lou . .ind lh,:n \\ ,,ulJ 
.:!IU\\ Jvwn. :\nJ thb 1i.:rticulur i111.:1tl1.:nt, il :.ceni..-~ cn:n rvui:htr th;m, y~•u l:i:m,. 
the llid,lyup that I h.11I :~\lll..:n in t•th.:r :.lllll), ,\ml lh..:11 ! duu·1 r.:1m:mbcr ,m~1hi11g 
11111il I w:,~ ,1:11h:.: c-:m1111t!. 
11.. J>.:1111n,1ri Dcp .. 1111. 114-11.,, 1-:~. I.) 
.y. 
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2. Kate Fort: 
HI. K.uc F,111 •imilil:I~ :c,::iil, :\SI.le~ GI\IIIY gcncul i1t~lna:1i .. ns 1•:lure t'1Ub.1rli11~ 
on the rid.:. Sh,: le;lilfod; 
1 l'lam1.irr h:·.=.tili .. ·d 0111: )lie du1a 111JI run~1t1hr vnt: v,;,i~ « 1hc uth:r, \.'\tl,C:lh\o'T A1htcy p,...: ha U1suU1.uun1. Durirlil, 
11~ d(')'lnili1111, Pl.si1:lilf 1c"'1itial "() I\ 11 pc,utbk lhAI yo~ ju.st r1on•1 rc1r.c,nt:cr. hctl th.\t t.l\:t~ nc1c b1)uue1N1n 
NI\.C'h'! ,\. I nw.in. 11'i .11".-Y• l~i>liibl•:.""U .. Pnui11uri I~;-., l)"l•".8. b~ I) 
-6-
(}. Wlml'> 1!10 1:..·.x1 thing ~0.1 r,•11"'111b:·r? 
,\, (Mlin~ i1\ :, lin~ "'On<c you"re "" the lmr~c. k:111 1bc n:ins this WJY 10 l!O 
nghl, 1hi, ,,11, tu~" left, m11: dnn't let lh~m c:il." Yuu \mow, ynu i•ul :1 Hui~ hit uf 
ins1mc1ion, . . 
13. Alier JcpartinH lium the Stcw~rl Fall• M,mJow. I.is" nnd 11:ilcy ~1mu11kJ Ill k,•c11 
their horses th1111 grn·1.ing. •.~hich in tum .:-.111s1.'\I their ho,~,:$ tu luH behind ,lii;htly. Lisa 1c~1ilk-d 
111~1. at 1bat point, she ,.,,~ ... ,till 1ryinµ 10 ~cl the hu11~ or 11w houc grazing." (.'i,•, I .. l'cnuuuri 
1 >,·r. 138:7-!I. h 1.) Kut,:""'' 1c,1ilk,I: 
(J. \\'en: :hclc an;- 1m1bkrn, will: :in~ of the riders ~cllin~ 11111 far behind llte 
olhcri! 
,\. Once lite 1mkr dmncc:c · up t\l S1c•.~1111 Full,, "c 1w1c 1nc11y mu,b in line. 
NubuJ, n:ally lut~•-J hch111d, bul otwe the onlcr chunccd. the,.: were definitely 
strrtchc~ where sum.: wcr~ furl!tc: behind 1lu111 othas, •11,-.:ilkully lluh:y 1111J 
l.is:i. 
(K. Fun Dc11 .• ,:U: !J-l'l, Ex.'/.) ~b. l'url furthcr lcstilicd: 
(). Oha;·. 
A. There "•re times whcrc I woul<I drfini1cty cnconragc hcr Ill runk !'n the 11.·ins 
h.1 IJ.Cl the h,1:-sc·s hcnd up ti1 ~l"\!Jl ii :noving. "Cum..: nn, h:ihy. \'ou'n: gnl lo 
kc,11 u11 with the HWUp." l.llll ocwr a point where I cnuld11'1 ,cc h.r. 
:\, Yc,. 
tK. Fort lkp .. ~o-ZJ-~$; ·11:l•lV. fa i I 
l 
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... ~' 
1-1. Ms. Fon lcs1itkd 1!1.11 Juring lhc ride RMlJ's iiuiJc, ,\ihh.:~. ins1ruclc\l the riJcrs, 
"Pull 1111 un lht! rdm, Uon'1 kl 1h.:m c.n." (K. Fort lkJl. -1 I :20-22. Fx. 7 1 
15. lkg,11Ji1111 the dis1:111cc bct~wcn her lu)IS\', 11:ih:y'll horse Jnd Pl11intilfs horse. 
Ms. T-url 1c,1ilicd: 
... We cu111i1111.:,I un th.: n:sl uf Ille trnil riJ1:. 1'11: rc11catcdl~ 1urui11g uiuuml, 
sp;:ci!ically le d:cd: 011 my J:111gh1cr, noticinl( • • ,·ou know, ~he w:1s s1ill h;1vini; 
trouble with her horse. a, ,, .. ,,. llllaintiffl, :1ml th\'}' w.·n: lmlh laci:inti hl·hind, ,11 
1 luh:y \\UUIJ lwc ht!t!J: J nu111b.:r vi' hur:»c lc11g1!::i l:chiml my l11.•1~t·, :111,I Plui111iff 
;1 number bchinJ Jl;llc)'. 
Nu1hing d~c i:; r\'11II) 11('1!;\bh: 111 1hc point where 1.i~:i 1~11 off .•.. 
(K. Furl l.>cp .. •l'.!:2- IO, fa. 7.) 
18. ~Is. Fnrt 1cslili.:i! thu1 :it the lime l'laintiff fell I Inky w::s "tlm:,: tu timr hor:11."" 
lcn~,h~ hdun,1 [hl!r} .. ii(. Fun lkp., -t-1:7-li. l:s. 7:1 btimi1tinlt lht· h:-nt!lh of a lli.lrse 1\1 1-.c 
11,:1;:y' s wh.:n :,he !ell. (Si:r K. I \111 l>cp., S5: 15· IC•. %. r •li. I:,. 7 J 
the: :;p!)I ,,fa·r~ Ph1in1iff tell, ,,i1h Huie(:. h1>r:ll~ hcing in l~rwccn. (.\"1•1· K. Furl Dcp, Jlll· -11;, Ex. 
7.) 
4 
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3. Suzanne Moau: 
t}. I h;;wl)' d1:st LUI~ 11 .... ~u11 1•.:.:;ll v.11:111 hhllm li,hbi ,1r mochiut 1b:a1 1111~ r,11.,·11 
~,~r,r lhc &:,mU1' ~f'I 1:11,11 PII IIW- m!c-7 
,\ I Nlin.: ,\,-bl~~ r..1hl l.1..i1 ~ lb.I~,> t,Ui~. lhm1 :wrr., UhU1i.:li11r.-. H,ul'! ,1t1J! 
I ju,l :uM."i! ;d,hn:I ti..: ~nJNu-1:1:n.e ..,,..., b~,w~ nnd th.:n:amc-.. ur\hr.-111. 
A Jwc ~,~1u1 :mm:i1111s tbt r.:~. ~nd I r=wrn~r ~h.--n ,w s.lnned ai:1, 11w 
h1n<,. ll,l,y'; t.on. :u1J l.,,.i• 1.,,.., ~•l'I <"Jlhi;t. 
v. UI• ~~· 1;;~l o111r i1u1t,1,1i;1111, giu:11 by A'iW-.·y d.l"t1.,1~1~(r.~ dl.'"IH Cr.1111 l.1:in1! 
C.,.; li.;;sc•\ p.m,•., 
A Y~ I 11:"111~•1111:~, Acll!t;- .1C.Jy1n!; • pull lll',- "r,11II 11f1.- .•\r.d I laltj' 'l\"M \'Cl}" 
o.m.111.111,l ,h: -.v.1~ 11.:-1 ,11,1.1! ~h•l•r:h h1 la.11 Y,.r!ll:h:~ il1: 1 .. ,1"1.:•~ l...-a11,l '-1•. 
i1 ., .. , i11 .. cauc:1inll', J\11n..:. :'-'-' lJcam·. U\ii,i •~ 1i:ic", J.,i11p ihh \\ ii: at.1:..c 1h, 
h,11,, J.~ ~ti'" :iathl c, -~~-:bin.,• lit~ m.,1 t 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARRY SIEGWART and 
LISA PENUNURI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT REDFORD, SUNDANCE 
PARTNERS, LTD., SUNDANCE 
HOLDING, LLC, SUNDANCE 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORAT ION, 
SUNDANCE INSTITUTE , INC., 
and ROCKY MOUNTA IN 
OUTFITTERS, LC., 
Defendants. 
-000-
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Case No. 08 0400019 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 31st day of Janu ary, 
2014, commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m., t he above-entitled 
mat ter came on for hea ring b e fore the HONORABLE CLAUD IA 
LAYCOCK , sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause and that t he fol lowing proceedings were 
had. 
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1 folder here, where it is in your--
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
MR. SANO: Oh. Certainly. In our brief? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. SANO: It--
THE COURT: I think I've got it. 
MR. SANO: It's Page 6--
MR. RINGWOOD: It's 9 and 10. 
MR. SANO: --10 and 20 of Mr. Earl's deposition. 
MR. RINGWOOD: We have the lines as well if your 
10 Honor would like--
11 
12 
13 
14 am. Okay. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 corner? 
22 
THE COURT: I've got them circled. 
MR. RINGWOOD: Okay. 
THE COURT: I've got it right here. I know where I 
MR. SANO: Thank you. 
MR. STRIEPER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Yeah. It's your Exhibit 3. 
All right. Thank you. 
(Recess) 
THE COURT: Settle the case over there in the 
Mr. Ringwood, am I still going to have to go to 
23 Heber for two weeks? 
24 MR. RINGWOOD: We've pared it down to like one week, 
25 so--
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2 
3 
4 
5 
THE COURT: You think? 
MR. RINGWOOD: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Have a seat, gentlemen. 
Oh, there's where my water went. 
Page 26 
Now, Counsel, the thought occurs to me that nothing 
6 about this case has been easy so far. And you told me when we 
7 did our first round and it went up on appeal that I was 
8 dealing with an issue of first impression and sure enough, you 
9 were right and the Supremes took it on cert and there we were. 
10 The issue here--well, let me start with what the 
11 parties agree, okay, as I see it. I think the parties agree 
12 that as to the gross negligence claim, which is the only claim 
13 we have left, that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to 
14 establish the standard of care. 
15 I think the parties agree that under the language of 
16 the Wycallis case, let me find that, and the lovely Footnote 8 
17 that goes with it, the language from the case is: 
18 Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless the 
19 applicable standard of care is fixed by law and reasonable 
20 minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's 
21 negligence under the circumstances. 
22 And then we--and this is talking about, it says 
23 above as a general proposition, summary judgment is 
24 inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits and 
25 should be employed only in the most clear cut cases. It's the 
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1 Footnote No. 8 that helps us here when it says: Expert 
2 testimony may be particularly helpful in elucidating the 
3 standard of care applicable here, in that case, where the 
4 average person has little understanding of the duties owed by 
5 particular trades or professions, expert testimony must 
6 ordinarily be presented to establish the standard of care. 
7 For instance, expert testimony has been required to establish 
8 the standard of care and then it lists medical doctors, 
9 architects, engineers, insurance brokers, professional real 
10 estate executors. 
11 So we don't have anything that's been established or 
12 fixed by law in this case. And so of necessity, the approach 
13 of the parties has been that it's got to be experts who will 
14 settle this issue for the jury. And I agree that this is not 
15 the kind of case where the average person is going to have an 
16 understanding of the duties owed by a trail ride company, not 
17 all that many of us, despite the fact that we're out in the 
18 west, that I know, ride horses and participate in trail rides. 
19 And so for that to be something that most of us would 
20 understand would not be true. 
21 So expert testimony is necessary to establish the 
22 standard of care. So the question becomes, under the case law 
23 and under 702, does Scott D. Earl the expert witness for the 
24 plaintiff, have the necessary experience to qualify? And 
25 reading from 702, Subparagraph (a) Subject to the limitations 
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1 in Paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an expert by 
2 knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
3 testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's 
4 scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
5 help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
6 determine a fact in issue. 
7 I think it's very clear that--that both witnesses, 
8 both experts were talking about their experience. Nobody said 
9 that they had a college degree in veterinary science or 
10 animals or anything like that and they're both relying on 
11 their experience, especially Mr. Earl, is relying on his 
12 experience as explained in his deposition and later, in the 
13 declaration that was given to us along with these motions, in 
14 October. 
15 And hang on a second, I have to figure out where I 
16 put it. So what his experience comes down to, I think, is not 
17 disputed. He tells us that when he was young, I suppose a 
18 teenager, for summer work, he worked for one summer--I was 
19 just looking to see if he gave us an age, but I think we can 
20 figure it out. He was 44 in 2010, so I think he was a 
21 teenager when this work happened or maybe in college. 
22 He says he was--he worked for one summer as a ranch 
23 hand and that was in 1982, and then in '83 and '84, he worked 
24 as a tour guide at Jeremy Ranch and to the question, how many 
25 guided tours do you think you took while you worked there that 
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1 summer? He said, Do you realize how long ago that was? Oh, 
2 roughly three or four a week. I think I said earlier today 
3 three or four a day, but he says three or four a week. 
4 So if I figured--I did a little rough math, if I 
5 figured a 12-week summer, that would be about 48 and two years 
6 would put him up about 96 to a hundred, somewhere in there, 
7 you know, approximately. So he has that work experience and 
8 it sounds like he was doing the same kind of stuff that Ashley 
9 Wright testifies about; he talks about doing the tack and--and 
10 preparing them and he says: So is it safe to say you were 
11 involved in the business A through Z? And he says all but 
12 the--the financing. 
13 So you would tack the horses, he was involved in 
14 instructing the patrons and basically how to get them to have 
15 the horse go, stop, turn one way or the other and to stay 
16 together. And he would talk to the patrons about the risk. 
17 
18 
So he--he goes on and then he tells us on Page 6, 
when asked about the industry standard as to the number of 
19 guides that would be required, says, I don't know the industry 
20 standard. I think that depends on your group of horses and 
21 the group of riders. I'm not even sure there is an industry 
22 standard. And then he talks about his opinions, what it could 
23 be based on his experience. 
24 Tells us on Page 20, he was not active as a guide 
25 since that time. 
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And didn't ever guide hunts. He says no, Why, do 
2 you want to go hunting? So we know he has a sense of humor. 
3 
4 
He is not aware of, if there is a publication or 
regulations or something he could go to to figure out what the 
5 industry standard would be. He thinks determining the 
6 industry standard would be mostly common sense and experience. 
7 He says on Page 22, the ideal spacing would be one 
8 to two horse lengths and he says in most common, most--he 
9 says, most common would be a half a horse length, most horses 
10 want to be with other horses. 
11 So it's--it's very clear that he had the experience 
12 as a teenager and from the declaration, he gives us more 
13 detail, frankly in response to the motions here, he says: No. 
14 7: Oh--well, looking at No. 6, he changed. He said in the 
15 summer of 1982 and 1983, I usually worked seven days a week 
16 and averaged three rides a day, so we've gone from three rides 
17 a week to three rides a day. 
18 7: I have owned two to six horses for nearly 30 
19 years. I presently own three horses. 
20 8: I currently ride my horses an average of 150 
21 miles a year. In my lifetime, I've ridden several thousand 
22 
23 
miles in the Utah mountains. 
So 9: I am familiar with how an average trail horse 
24 behaves when it is on a trail ride. 
25 10: I know how to prevent horses from suddenly 
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1 accelerating and how to minimize gaps in a train of horses on 
2 a trail ride. 
3 And from there, he talks about his experience as a 
4 mounted patrol officer, doesn't tell us how long or what all 
5 he did, just says he was one. And then he goes to talking 
6 about the factors that contributed to the plaintiff's falling 
7 off the horse. 
8 The problem with the declaration and its expert--and 
9 Mr. Earl's efforts to augment what he said at his deposition 
10 is that he still doesn't really give us any foundation for 
11 these claims. He says, I am familiar with how an average 
12 trail horse behaves when it's on a trial ride. He doesn't 
13 tell us how many times he's been trail riding, he doesn't tell 
14 us that he organized it, he doesn't tell us that he was 
15 working•with inexperienced people who had never been on a 
16 horse before, or like the plaintiff here, had had two previous 
17 horse lessons--horse riding lessons. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 yes. 
25 
Am I remembering that correctly, Mr. Strieper? 
MR. STRIEPER: You are, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Down in Arizona, she's had two--
MR. STRIEPER: Two--
THE COURT: --riding lessons before she came up. 
MR. STRIEPER: Yeah. Two arena lessons, I believe, 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
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1 And he hasn't owned a business where that's his 
2 exclusive--well, maybe not exclusive, but one of his primary 
3 concerns and he hasn't managed riders or trail guides under 
4 him, such as Ashley Wright. He's been doing other things and 
5 this has been, for him, recreational, rather than a business. 
6 So I find that the declaration doesn't really help 
7 fill in the gaps when it comes to the experience that is being 
8 talked about in 702. And as I was back there thinking about 
9 it and talking to my law clerk, I understand that it may be 
10 that there's a fine line or may be a thicker line here that I 
11 have to look at very carefully to make sure I'm not making a 
12 decision that's--that is a decision on weight as opposed to 
13 qualifications. And I appreciate your arguments about that, 
14 Mr. Strieper, because I think that is a great concern, it's 
15 something I thought about a great deal last night as I read 
16 this. The temptation is to compare his qualifications to the 
17 defendants' expert, whose names I've just--Rex--Rex Walker; 
18 right? Okay. To Mr. Walker's qualifications. Where he's 
19 owned these businesses for many years and has run this kind of 
20 a show as a profession for many, many years. And so I'm--in 
21 my analysis, my attempt is not to compare him to Mr. Walker 
22 because that would go to weight and that's something that 
23 would end up in front of the jury. The question for me is the 
24 initial question of qualification under 702. 
25 And I think that the case that I brought up in 
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1 talking to Mr. Strieper is applicable. The--it's a Tenth 
2 Circuit case that's looking at Utah law and this is F--I'm 
3 sorry, 575 F.310 1120, Milne, M-i-1-n-e, and Hall vs. USA 
4 Cycling, Inc. And as we talked about earlier, this is the 
5 case, takes place out in the Canyonlands National Park area 
6 where they have a bike race called the tour of the 
7 Canyonlands, it's a cross country mountain bike race outside 
8 of Moab, six miles of an open course, dirt road, where the 
9 racers shared the road with the automatic--the--I'm sorry, the 
10 automobile traffic. And we have a--a biker who is hit by a--
11 an SUV pulling a--a trailer and is killed and then another one 
12 who is injured and so this lawsuit is filed in Federal 
13 District Court. 
14 And the expert who was thrown out by the District 
15 Court and that decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court, 
16 Tenth Circuit Court, had experience in his youth riding 
17 mountain bikes and I can't remember whether he'd actually been 
18 in a couple of races, but he'd had some experience in his 
19 youth and then in his adult life, organized road bikes, road 
20 bike races where they're on paved roads instead of the dirt 
21 road that was in this case. 
22 And in reading from Paragraph 2, the analysis, the 
23 second paragraph, Although Mr. Collingsworth had experience 
24 organizing and supervising paved road bike races, the District 
25 Court reasonably concluded that his experience was 
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1 insufficient to qualify him to testify about mountain bike 
2 races. 
3 And then they talk about the difference between the 
4 races and the level of experience. 
5 Even though this case is talking about, it's all 
6 about bikes, but two different kinds of bike races that are 
7 very different, I think if Mr. Collingsworth didn't qualify, 
8 even though he was a bike rider and organized races and the 
9 difference was the kinds of races, if he doesn't qualify, 
10 having very similar experience, I don't see how Mr. Earl could 
11 qualify here, where he hasn't organized--he doesn't tell us 
12 that he's been organizing these rides that he was the guide in 
13 charge, that he's had more experience doing what he did as a 
14 teenager at Jeremy Ranch. What it comes down to is, he's a 
15 guy who likes horses, has a lot of experience with horses, but 
16 he doesn't have the experience that would allow him to opine 
17 in this case on the standard of care and to establish that for 
18 the jury. 
19 And I don't think that he can rely on anything as 
20 per Jenkins vs. Jordan Water Valley that was established by 
21 Rocky Mountain Outfitters as in their guidelines. I think 
22 that case takes any of that out of the question here, so he's 
23 just left with dealing with his experience and I don't think 
24 under 702, he has the necessary experience to act as an expert 
25 witness on the standard of care. 
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Mr. Strieper, could you answer my question, was he 
2 designated just for ans--for standard of care? Or was he also 
3 for causation? 
4 MR. STRIEPER: He's--he is also partially for 
5 causation. 
6 
7 
THE COURT: We haven't been moving around enough. 
The lights go out if you don't move around. It's not a sign 
8 from God. 
9 
10 
11 
All right. Back to your answer. 
MR. STRIEPER: He--he has been designated as far as 
causation during the horse ride. There's also--we also have 
12 Dennis Gemboline as to the standards according to the policies 
13 and procedure that Rocky Mountain Outfitters has followed or 
14 doesn't--hasn't followed their own--
15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. So--but I 
16 think the motion really was to just throw him out as a 
17 standard of care expert; right? 
18 
19 
MR. RINGWOOD: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So that's all the further I need 
20 to go then. 
21 
22 
MR. STRIEPER: Can--can I also point out one other 
thing? The case that you're looking at is a Federal case 
23 which deals with the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is 
24 completely separate than the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
25 especially with a--
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THE COURT: I understand. But I think the theories 
2 are still the same. 
3 
4 
5 
MR. STRIEPER: Okay. 
THE COURT: So--
MR. RINGWOOD: Your Honor, on the point of 
6 causation, that was addressed in the first motion that we 
7 
8 
filed and--
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let--let's get to that. 
9 With--and I'll ask the defendants' attorneys to--the defense 
10 attorneys to write the order on--on my ruling that I just 
11 
12 
gave. 
Now, so that takes us to the next question. As far 
13 as the other motion, it would solve any issues--or resolve any 
14 issues as to standard of care and their standard of care 
15 expert. The rest of the motion, I think, was basically 
16 dealing with the issue of gross negligence and you're saying 
17 also some--I need to look at your opening paragraphs again. 
18 In this case, plaintiffs' own liability expert, 
19 Scott Earl, has testified there is no evidence that defendants 
20 exercised no care. 
21 In addition, the undisputed facts further 
22 demonstrate that plaintiff will be unable to present evidence 
23 sufficient to establish a claim of gross negligence. 
24 Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claim for gross negligence should 
25 be dismissed as a matter of law. 
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1 In addition, plaintiffs' claim for gross negligence 
2 fails because there is no evidence upon which plaintiff can 
3 establish that defendants' actions were the proximate cause of 
4 
5 
her injury. 
Plaintiffs' expert believes that the plaintiff fell 
6 from her horse when it suddenly accelerated. He has testified 
7 that there are numerous reasons why plaintiff's horse 
8 accelerated and that there is no way to predict when it might 
9 occur. It is simply part of the inherent risk of horseback 
10 riding. Because there is no way to eliminate the inherent 
11 risk associated with horseback riding as being the proximate 
12 cause of her injury, plaintiffs' claim fails as a matter of 
13 law. 
14 So where do you think you are, what's left on your 
15 
16 
motion after my ruling? 
MR. STRIEPER: That's a good question, your Honor. 
17 I think that right now, causation--well, without the expert, I 
18 
19 
20 
guess that would take care--
THE COURT: If he doesn't testify--
MR. STRIEPER: If he doesn't testify and so there's 
21 no evidence regarding causation--
22 
23 
24 
THE COURT: Coming from Mr. Earl. 
MR. STRIEPER: --so I--I--exactly. So--
THE COURT: Do you want--do you three want to talk 
25 about me and let me--shall I leave the room and let you--the 
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4 THE CLERK: I've got Mr. Strieper and Mr. Ringwood. 
5 THE COURT: Whew, glad I looked. All right. Let me put 
6 this on the record again. We are on the record now in the 
7 matter of Penunuri versus Sundance, our case number 
8 080400019. I have Robert Strieper on the phone representing 
9 plaintiffs and Burt Ringwood on the phone representing the 
10 defendants. 
11 We had oral argument on January 31st of this year on two 
12 motions, the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
13 regarding plaintiff's gross negligence claim and the 
14 defendant's alternative motion for summary judgment and 
15 motion to exclude Scott Earl as an expert witness. At that 
16 time I found for the defendants on their motion to exclude 
17 Scott Earl as an expert witness, and explained all my 
18 reasoning on the record. I took under advisement the 
19 remaining motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff's 
20 gross negligence and also the remainder of the second motion, 
21 which would be whether or not I would grant summary judgment 
22 based on the exclusion of Mr. Earl as an expert witness. 
23 Since that time, gentlemen, I have listened to the oral 
24 arguments again from that hearing. I have re-read all of the 
25 memoranda and looked at the exhibits again, and have taken 
2 
Q 
~ 
~ 
@ 
1 another look at all the case law that the parties relied 
2 upon. So I think I'm ready to go. And as we all know in 
3 this case, I do everything with the view that it's probably 
4 gonna go up on appeal, but I'll leave that up to you. 
5 At the end of the discussion on the defendant's 
6 alternative motion for summary judgment and motion to exclude 
7 Scott Earl as an expert witness, as I indicated, I granted 
8 the motion to exclude, but didn't go so far as granting the 
9 motion, the alternative motion for summary judgment. 
10 Instead, I asked the attorneys whether there was a case left 
11 for the plaintiff to pursue without the plaintiff's standard 
12 of care expert, Scott Earl. The attorneys discussed that 
13 question with me and we kind of, in all honesty, wandered off 
14 into an area and Mr. Strieper ended up at the podium and at 
15 some point I pulled things back and we went back to letting 
16 the moving party go first, and so we just went forward with 
17 the discussion of the remaining motion. It was Mr. Sano who 
18 was arguing that for the defendants. And part of the 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
discussion with the attorneys had included Mr. Strieper's 
claim that he could still make his case by using the 
defendant's expert witness, Rex Walker, whom he had 
cross-designated a witness, although not a standard of care 
witness. 
As part of Mr. Strieper's discussion, he pulled in 
testimony from Mr. Walker's report and his disposition, as I 
3 
1 recall. At some point Mr. Sano commented that he was not 
2 arguing the motion that had been filed and that he wasn't 
3 prepared to argue about Mr. Walker's testimony and how it 
4 could be used to save the plaintiff's case since I had 
5 excluded Mr. Earl. This was some concern to me, in fact, a 
6 great deal of concern to me as I later reviewed the audiotape 
7 of the hearing and the parties' memoranda. And after looking 
8 at everything, I'm inclined to agree with Mr. Sano. Because 
9 of my questions and Mr. Strieper's defensive claim that he 
10 would be able to use Mr. Walker's testimony in his case in 
11 chief, we strayed away from the pleadings and the original 
12 positions of the parties in their pleadings. 
13 I've looked very carefully at the memoranda filed by 
14 both parties in both motions. Although Mr. Strieper brought 
15 in testimony from Walker in both of his opposition memoranda, 
16 he never made the claim in either memorandum that he had 
17 cross-designated Mr. Walker, the defendant's expert, as a 
18 standard of care expert. And he never made the claim in his 
19 writings that could use Mr. Walker's testimony in his in 
20 the plaintiff's case in chief to establish the standard of 
21 care. Instead, he merely defended his expert, Scott Earl, 
22 and his qualifications to opine on the standard of care for 
23 trail guide businesses. 
24 After looking at everything, I've concluded that I must 
25 disregard the argument that pertained to the plaintiff's 
4 
~ 
1 cross-designation of the defendant's witnesses. It was not 
2 an argument made by plaintiff in either opposition memorandum 
3 and it unfairly shifted the argument from the original motion 
4 for summary judgment regarding gross negligence and causation 
5 to a topic that the defendants were unprepared to tackle. 
6 And by that I mean, coming back with their own portions of 
7 Mr. Walker's testimony that supported their position. So I'm 
8 going to back up and treat the motions and the memoranda as 
9 they actually came in before me, before we had that 
10 discussion. 
11 Moving to the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
12 regarding the plaintiff's gross negligence claim, there's no 
13 disagreement between the parties, I believe -- well, with a 
14 couple of minor exceptions -- as to the standard for gross 
15 negligence. Both parties are relying on essentially the same 
16 case law. It comes down to a definition used by the 
17 defendants in -- from Atkin Wright and Miles versus Mountain 
18 States Tele -- that must be Telephone and Telegraph Company. 
19 Gross negligence is a failure to observe even slight care. 
20 It is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows 
21 utter indifference to the consequences that may result. 
22 Recklessness is defined in the Daniels versus Gamma West case 
23 as conduct where the actor knew or had reason to know of 
24 facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to 
25 another, and still deliberately proceeds to act or fail to 
5 
1 act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk. 
2 And Milne case says that the risk must be substantially 
3 greater than that which is necessary to make the conduct 
4 negligent. And it also adds that there's an unreasonable 
5 risk of physical harm to another person. 
6 We've talked about the fact that generally summary 
7 judgment, as is requested here, is inappropriate in gross 
8 negligence cases, and it should only be granted in the most 
9 clearcut circumstances. We discussed at length the Wycallis 
10 case, which says that the standard of if the standard of 
11 care is not fixed by law, expert testimony is ordinarily 
12 required to establish the standard of care. And I relied 
13 upon that a great deal in making my decision with regard to 
14 the exclusion of Mr. Earl. 
15 Lastly, the Blaisdell case states that summary judgment 
16 is appropriate in gross negligence cases when the plaintiff 
17 cannot -- cannot show utter indifference on the part of the 
18 defendant. 
19 Now, the interesting thing about the way that this was 
20 all set up by the defendant is in their memorandum, their 
21 opening memorandum -- excuse me just a minute -- they relied 
22 not as much on their own expert, but they used the testimony 
23 through either the report or the disposition of Mr. Earl to 
24 establish that even with the use of his opinions, gross 
25 negligence could not be proven. 
6 
@ 
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1 As I look at the case now, without the plaintiff being 
2 able to use the opinions of Mr. Earl in the plaintiff's case 
3 in chief, the arguments made by the defendants in their 
4 memoranda become even stronger. The testimony which I think 
5 is undisputed is that Ashley Wright, who was acting as the 
6 trail guide in this incident, was attempting to slow down the 
7 group. That was her testimony, that she was attempting to 
8 slow down the group so that the last two horses could catch 
9 up. She was attempting to get the group to a larger 
10 clearing, an open area where she could get the group back 
11 together, and then she was actually going to pony -- which 
12 from what I read means to go back, she was going to go back 
13 to Hailey's horse and guide Hailey's horse for her by taking 
14 the reins and pulling the horse along with her so that the 
15 horse would quit grazing. I don't find anything in the 
16 undisputed facts which persuades me that Ashley, and thereby 
17 the other defendants, failed to observe even slight care. I 
18 don't find that under the definition of recklessness from 
19 Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, is the full title, that 
she knew or had reason to know of facts which created a high 
degree of risk of physical harm, and that she deliberately 
proceeded to act or failed to act in conscious disregard of 
or indifference to that risk. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
As I look at what we're dealing with here, we've got 
ordinary negligence, which is kind of the baseline, and then 
7 
1 we've got gross negligence, which is far, far above and 
2 beyond ordinary negligence. And I don't think that under 
3 those facts which are truly undisputed here, we have anything 
4 that shows Ashley acted in a way that showed utter disregard 
5 and a lack of care for the situation. She said that she was 
6 trying to keep them in her sights, she was trying to slow 
7 down the group, and she was aware of the issues and was 
8 attempting to solve the problem. I think for the plaintiff 
9 to succeed here and to prove that she showed a failure to 
10 observe even slight care, she would have just had to have 
11 marched on at normal speed, perhaps taking the more 
12 experienced riders with her and leaving the three less 
13 experienced riders, including Hailey's mother, in the dust, 
14 so to speak, and that didn't happen. She was aware of what 
15 was going on, was attempting to solve the problems. At that 
16 point in the trail, from everything that the parties have 
17 listed in their facts, she was not in a position to go back, 
18 there wasn't room for her to go back past the other horses in 
19 order to pony up Hailey's horse and to get to Lisa Penunuri 
20 and solve those problems. So I adopt the arguments that were 
21 made by the plaintiff in both of their memorandum --
22 memoranda. 
23 The defendant's response has to do with the employer's 
24 manual, the employee -- RMOs employee manual, and rather goes 
25 back to the same arguments that I rejected in the motion to 
8 
Q 
1 exclude Mr. Earl. And I don't find, again, that the standard 
2 of care can be established through the manual based on the 
3 case law. 
4 The other portion of the argument from the plain --
5 sorry, from the defendants was the proximate cause, and I 
6 agree with the defendants that the undisputed facts we have 
7 only lead to speculation as to the cause, the proximate cause 
8 of the plaintiff's injuries. And that would be one 
9 plaintiff's injuries, Mrs. Penunuri's injuries. Even -- even 
10 Scott Earl speculated as to three or four different causes, 
11 possible causes of her injuries, what caused the horse to 
12 move faster and in theory, knock her off. But truly, no one 
13 saw enough of what happened to know why she fell, and she 
14 can't tell us either. So I also adopt that theory as 
15 expressed and argued by the defendants. 
16 Let me just check and see if there's anything else I 
17 wanted to say. That's pretty well it. On the whole, I adopt 
18 the arguments made by the defendants and those undisputed 
19 facts which support those arguments, and I grant the motion 
20 for summary judgment regarding plaintiff 1 s gross negligence 
21 claim. 
22 On the basis -- on the second motion, the alternative 
23 motion for summary judgment, without Scott Earl as an expert 
24 witness regarding the standard of care, I would also grant 
25 the alternative motion for summary judgment. 
9 
1 And I'll ask Mr. Ringwood and Mr. Sano to prepare 
2 appropriate orders in that regard. 
3 So, counsel, that's the decision, and I think with that, 
4 there's really nothing to go forward on. Would that be 
5 correct from your viewpoint, Mr. Strieper? 
6 MR.. STRIEPER: Well, there will be an appeal. Other 
7 than that, yeah 
8 THE COURT: Okay, yeah. Well, that I -- that I agree, 
9 but I meant at this level. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
MR.. STRIEPER: Right. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STRIEPER: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you agree, Mr. Ringwood? 
MR.. RINGWOOD: Yes, I do. Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then since there's going to be an 
16 appeal, I would ask Mr. Ringwood that in your orders, that 
17 you by reference include my oral ruling from today and the 
18 other day, and that you also make them very complete, 
19 including the undisputed facts. It wouldn't be findings of 
20 fact, but it would need to be labeled undisputed facts as 
21 found by the Court, and including with it your conclusions of 
22 law as to the legal discussion and then the final order. 
23 All right. Thank you, gentlemen. It's been a pleasure 
24 to work with you lo these many years and 
25 MR.. RINGWOOD: Yes, thank you, your Honor. 
10 
1 THE COURT: -- we'll see where we all end up on this. 
2 And I appreciate the time and your efforts in working this 
3 case. 
MR. RINGWOOD: Thank you. 4 
5 THE COURT: Okay. That will be it for today. Thank you 
6 very much. Bye-bye. 
7 MR. STRIEPER: Thank you. Bye. 
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